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Call to Order 
 
Howard Koh, M.D., M.P.H., COTPER BSC Chair 
Harvey V. Fineberg Professor of the Practice of Public Health 
Associate Dean for Public Health Practice 
Director, Division of Public Health Practice 
Harvard School of Public Health 
 
Dr. Howard Koh called the meeting to order, acknowledging what a privilege it was to serve as 
Chair for the very distinguished members of the Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC) for the 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER). He  was 
pleased to welcome the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Director, Dr. 




Julie Gerberding, M.D., M.P.H., Director 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
 
Dr. Gerberding welcomed those present, expressing her excitement about the convening of the 
first COTPER BSC meeting. She recognized that the members’ agreement to serve on an 
advisory committee was a tribute to the importance ofthis effort. She emphasized that the 
commitment to have CDC’s preparedness programs be science-based was viewed as a key 
principle of operation by the CDC. The CDC’s success is based on the science that takes place 
behind the scenes and which brings an evidence base, confidence, and integrity to make wise 
decisions that people can trust and respect even under difficult circumstances. Recent news 
had centered on the alleged conduct of a person who may have been the perpetrator of the 
2001 anthrax attacks. The science of CDC was very much in play from that first day in 
2001when consideration was being given to how to diagnose the organism and how to 
understand its genetic resistance capabilities. CDC’s laboratories played a key role in the 
diagnostic capabilities with respect to molecular fingerprinting, connecting the various 
outbreaks, environmental sampling, personal protective equipment, communication, and other 
areas.. Nevertheless, Dr. Gerberding stressed that the COTPER Board was in place because 
there remained gaps in the science.  
 
As CDC moved through the anthrax attacks and their aftermath, a number of after action 
reviews were conducted. One of the most important concepts that arose was the issue of 
competency: that there were aspects of science that the agency did not have, and aspects of 
the way CDC worked in the context of a scientific environment that did not allow for the broad 
type of instant thinking and learning that was required during an event. For example, there were 
issues that caused CDC to get off track, such as the dogma that it took 50,000 spores to cause 
disease, or that anthrax could not be re-aerosolized. There were numerous issues for which 
there was little known about the science so it was difficult to understand the nature of the threat 
(e.g., who would be at risk, how fast that risk would unfold, and what else might have been done 
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to mitigate against risk). Dr. Gerberding stressed that she was not criticizing where the agency 
was at that time, but wanted to illustrate that being successful truly does depend upon science. 
She recognized that it was critical to have external advisors who are knowledgeable about what 
CDC perceives as its goals, objectives, direction, and prioritization of investments, and to inform 
the agency when it is not on track with how the external community perceives CDC’s priorities, 
performance expectations, gaps, and connections with others (e.g., scientific, academic, or 
private sector). Input with respect to these areas would be tremendously beneficial contribution 
that the COTPER BSC could make to the agency.  
 
Dr. Gerberding pointed out that the COTPER BSC members were also convened as part of a 
broader commitment CDC has made since undergoing a structural reorganization to become a 
more integrated CDC. A revised CDC policy mandates that all of the agency’s intramural 
programs should be peer reviewed by BSCs. While this has been a tradition in the National 
Center for Infectious Disease (NCID) for a long time, it has not been normative for the entire 
agency. Therefore, she made a personal commitment to ensure that all of CDC’s science and 
programs had the benefit of external peer reviews of a caliber at least comparable to the 
National Institutes of Health’s (NIH’s) process. The COTPER BSC is to be part of the process of 
ensuring quality, a standard of excellence, and making recommendations for improvements 
where necessary. Dr. Gerberding also recognized those who were present from COTPER and 
the scientific community at CDC, and expressed her gratitude for their support of this effort and 
the extraordinary work they do.  
 
With respect to the functional anthrax exercise that was underway at CDC at the time of the 
BSC meeting, Dr. Gerberding assured everyone that it was not timed to correspond to the 
current newspaper reports, but was a coincidence that unfortunately was bearing an uncanny 
likeness to some of the issues that were historically noteworthy. She explained that it was a 
greater than 48-hour functional exercise during which the stockpile actually had been deployed 
to a particular community, CDC laboratories were testing samples, and critical operational 
performance exercises were being conducted to ensure that the agency had, indeed, engaged 
in the learning and the advancement of the agenda.  
 
In conclusion, Dr. Gerberding extended her personal thanks to the COTPER BSC and 
impressed upon them the importance of their charge. She viewed this endeavor as a new 
chapter in preparedness for which she hoped CDC would be on the leading edge. 
 
COTPER Welcoming Remarks 
 
Richard E. Besser, M.D., Director  
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Besser welcomed those present, stressing that Dr. Gerberding had been a strong advocate 
for establishing the COTPER BSC and recognized that this was an historic day at CDC and for 
COTPER. COTPER is one of the younger organizations at CDC and as such is learning, 
growing, and establishing new ways of doing business. He thanked the members 
wholeheartedly for agreeing to participate on the COTPER BSC and to lend to this review the 
varied backgrounds they each represented. While CDC historically has had a number of BSCs, 
he thought the COTPER BSC was unique in terms of the types of disciplines represented (e.g., 
traditional public health and medicine, engineering, informatics, behavioral sciences, etc.). 
COTPER is very open to external eyes and to ensuring that they use this opportunity together to 
help the nation become more prepared. Clearly, enormous improvements have been made in 
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this country in the area of preparedness; however, much more remains to be done. In addition 
to the large-scale anthrax exercise, Dr. Besser pointed out that CDC continued to respond to 
the large Salmonella outbreak that was on-going throughout the nation and to monitor Hurricane 
Edouard with resources already positioned should they be needed. He pointed out that all of this 
was being done with systems that did not exist 10 years ago.  
 
In conclusion, Dr. Besser stressed that COTPER looked forward to BSC’s engagement, 
expertise, and guidance.  
 
Overview and Introductions 
 
Howard Koh, M.D., M.P.H., COTPER BSC Chair 
Harvey V. Fineberg Professor of the Practice of Public Health 
Associate Dean for Public Health Practice 
Director, Division of Public Health Practice 
Harvard School of Public Health 
 
Dr. Koh explained that the BSC consisted of 10 BSC appointees, 3 voting ex-officio members, 
and 6 non-voting liaisons. In addition, senior COTPER leaders and other members of CDC and 
the public were present. He indicated that this was a public meeting for which the minutes would 
be compiled and ultimately placed on CDC’s website. He expressed gratitude to Drs. Sosin and 
Ellis and their staff that spent a considerable amount of time and effort developing the 
framework for this meeting. He then reviewed the meeting agenda and ground rules and led 





Dan Sosin, M.D., M.P.H., Designated Federal Official 
Director, Biosurveillance Coordination Unit  
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
On behalf of CDC, COTPER, and the federal government, Dr. Sosin extended his welcome and 
gratitude to those present for their commitment to doing this hard work. He explained that his 
role as the Designated Federal Official (DFO) for the COTPER BSC was to serve as their point 
of contact, tour guide, and research assistant in order to ensure that the Chair and the Board 
received what they needed in order to fulfill their charge.  
 
Dr. Sosin read the following excerpt from the COTPER BSC Charter with respect to their 
function, “The Board of Scientific Counselors, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness 
and Emergency Response, shall advise the Secretary, HHS, and the Director, CDC, concerning 
strategies and goals for the programs and research within the divisions; shall conduct peer-
review of scientific programs; and monitor the overall strategic direction and focus of the 
divisions. The board, after conducting its periodic reviews, shall submit a written description of 
the results of the review and its recommendations to the Director, CDC. The board shall perform 
second-level peer review of applications for grants-in-aid for research and research training 
activities, cooperative agreements, and research contract proposals relating to the broad areas 
within the coordinating office.” Dr. Sosin pointed out that while most of this meeting would focus 
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upon orientation and the peer review process for intramural peer review, COTPER has an 
extramural research program that was begun in 2008 for which it was expected that the 
COTPER BSC would serve in the function of secondary and other related science review 
activities in accordance with the charter. Beyond the explicitly stated purpose,  the goal of the 
BSC would be to create and support a transparent, multi-disciplinary process for expert review, 
advance COTPER’s capacity to improve its processes, programs, and provide vision through 
science-based input from the BSC to the Directors of COTPER and CDC. The BSC’s 
recommendations would ensure that COTPER’s programs, wherever possible, would be 
grounded in science and that COTPER would evaluate and implement evidence-based 
practices, protocols, and policies to improve its national and international role in emergency 
preparedness and response. 
 
The science base for public health emergency preparedness is broadly distributed across many 
disciplines, which Dr. Sosin pointed out, was reflected in the make-up of the COTPER BSC. 
Recognizing the numerous gaps in the science and the problems for which they are preparing, 
COTPER was asking BSC members to share their scientific knowledge and relate it to COTPER 
through targeted reviews. While no one is bestowed with the entirety of human knowledge, Dr. 
Sosin acknowledged that the BSC’s best efforts to inform COTPER programs and practices 
from the perspective of deeply trained and experienced scientists would serve everyone well. As 
Drs. Gerberding and Besser suggested, COTPER’s work would be an open book to the BSC as 
they sought thoughtful science-based guidance in order to best utilize COTPER’s resources. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Sosin introduced Diane Manheim, Coordinator for the COTPER BSC. He also 
expressed his regret that he would not be able to attend the second day of the meeting; 
however, he indicated that Dr. Ellis would serve in his place, and acknowledged that for the past 
seven months, Dr. Ellis had served as the DFO for this work and as the Acting Associate 







Richard E. Besser, M.D., Director 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Besser offered an overview of COTPER and of CDC’s preparedness and emergency 
response efforts. CDC is presently engaged in a very exciting activity known as the “Healthiest 
Nation Alliance.” This activity is being conducted in conjunction with other governmental public 
health organizations, such as the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) 
and the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), in an effort to 
address the challenge faced in the United States of spending more per capita than any other 
country on health, with health outcomes not at the highest level. Through this initiative, 
particularly as the nation faces a political transition, there are opportunities to move forward to 
create a true “Healthiest Nation.” 
 
A healthy nation fares better during a public health emergency. For example, those impacted 
the most by Hurricane Katrina were individuals with chronic diseases and those who were not 
empowered to make health decisions for themselves. Becoming a Healthiest Nation will make 
COTPER Overview Presentation
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communities more resilient and better able to deal with public health threats and emergencies. 
The focus of the alliance is to promote and sustain health in a broader context than health care 
and health reform; enact health in all policies, creating opportunities to integrate health 
considerations into societal policies across sectors and at all levels; and to execute health 
protection goals to achieve greater health impact by focusing on priorities and needs identified 
by CDC in its Goal Action Plans and portfolio analyses. CDC organizes its activities around four 
overarching health protection goals: Healthy People in all Stages of Life, Healthy People in 
Healthy Places, Healthy People in a Healthy World, and People Prepared for Emerging Health 
Threats.  
 
Dr. Besser wanted to acknowledge that CDC recognizes the enormous burden of chronic 
diseases and other health issues. However, COTPER focuses on urgent threats: infectious 
diseases, new and emerging infectious diseases, on-going large-scale food borne outbreaks, 
pandemic threats, deliberate threats (like the World Trade Center in 2001 and the following 
anthrax attacks),  and natural disasters.. Concerns have also been raised about climate change 
and the possibility that this will lead to increasing threats of natural disasters.  
Concerns have also been raised about climate change and the possibility that this will lead to 
increasing threats of natural disasters.  
 
CDC does not view preparedness as an end state, but rather is the continuous process of 
improving the health system’s capacity to detect, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the 
consequences of terrorism and other health emergencies. The agency’s over-arching 
preparedness goal is that people in all communities will be protected from infectious, 
occupational, environmental, and terrorist threats. CDC is cognizant of the fact that public health 
protection in an increasingly smaller world requires fast detection, fast science, fast and 
effective communication, fast and effective integration, and fast and effective action. The 
process that COTPER will go through with the BSC will hopefully improve CDC’s systems, 
speed, and readiness.  
 
CDC and COTPER are also aware that preparedness is not just about public health but also a 
much broader system and networks of shared responsibility for protecting the public’s health. 
This network includes federal and local governmental systems, domestic and international 
systems, public and private partnerships, animal and human health, and partnership across 
multiple sectors. CDC does not operate on its own—it is part of a much larger framework. 
CDC’s work in preparedness supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which has 
overall authority for emergency response activities as laid out in the National Response 
Framework (NRF); and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which under the 
NRF has responsibility for Emergency Support Function 8, public health and medical services. 
There have been a number of recent Legislative and Presidential Directives that have impacted 
on the focus of CDC’s work. This includes the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, 
passed in December of 2006. This placed HHS as the lead agency for public health and medical 
response. It also drove a number of programmatic changes and advances within CDC. In 
addition, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD – 21; October 2007) legislates that 
HHS lead federal efforts regarding national biosurveillance strategy and medical 
countermeasure distribution. Dr. Sosin is the lead in this effort for CDC, and is also the lead 
across the federal government for the activities to develop a biosurveillance strategy. 
 
CDC takes an all-hazards approach to preparedness and response. Although the agency’s 
resources frequently are categorical (e.g., significant funds for pandemic flu, significant funds for 
terrorism), CDC knows that the systems underpinning its preparedness and response for 
various scenarios are basically the same. The all-hazards approach prepares for a multitude of 
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events through information systems, training, planning, communications, and readiness. 
Experience has shown that preparing for and responding to one type of event can also help to 
prepare for and respond to other events. All-hazards preparedness and response encompass 
biological, nuclear, radiological, trauma, chemical, and natural events. The all-hazards approach 
also allows federal, state, and local partners to maximize the limited resources available for 
preparedness and response programs.  
 
COTPER is one of six coordinating offices or coordinating centers within CDC, which were 
established through CDC’s organizational restructuring as part of the Futures Initiative. 
COTPER’s work is vertical in terms of its own programs and horizontal working across the 
agency. Within COTPER, there are five divisions, four of which are programmatic: Strategic 
National Stockpile, Select Agents and Toxins, Emergency Operations, and State and Local 
Readiness. There are six offices within COTPER’s Office of the Director: Office of Science and 
Public Health Practice, Department of Defense (DoD) Liaison, Workforce and Career 
Development Office, Enterprise Communication Office, Learning Office for Preparedness & 
Response, and Strategy and Innovation Office.  
 
COTPER’s vision for preparedness is simple: People protected—public health prepared. 
COTPER’s new proposed mission statement is: We safeguard health and save lives by 
providing a flexible and robust platform for public health emergency response. Emerging from 
this mission are four strategic themes, which are to build internal response capabilities at CDC; 
build external response capabilities, primarily in state and local public health; connect COTPER 
within CDC and build connections outside of COTPER; and optimize the resources received. At 
present, COTPER receives about a quarter of CDC’s budget. Thus, it is absolutely critical that  
reviews be undertaken in order to ensure that COTPER is directing those funds in the most 
effective way possible. Strategic activities in support of these themes are to provide strategic 
direction on preparedness as well as training and education to CDC; allocate terrorism 
preparedness resources across CDC; ensure program accountability by integrating budget and 
performance; serve as point of contact on preparedness for key stakeholders; promote progress 
through public health science; and report on progress and challenges in public health 
preparedness. Critical operational activities are to manage CDC’s Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement, which funds state and local preparedness efforts; 
manage the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and critical medical assets; manage CDC’s 
emergency response operations through the Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC); 
and manage the regulation of the possession, use, and transfer of select agents (SAs) to protect 
public health and safety. 
 
Dr. Besser briefly reported on the offices within COTPER. The Learning Office for Preparedness 
and Response (LOPR) headed by Andrea Young develops and executes CDC preparedness 
and response learning strategy. It provides oversight and coordinates analysis, design, 
development, implementation, and evaluation of workforce development programs for internal 
and external responders. This includes the development of competency-based curriculum for 
CDC responders; meta-leadership development activities, including a program in conjunction 
with Harvard and a national roll-out of programs; training programs with schools of public health, 
including the Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP); and activities related to planning 
and implementation of Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAPHA / HSPD-21) core 
curricular activities.  
 
The Workforce and Career Development Office (WCDO) headed by Deborah Gould provides 
oversight and coordination for planning, developing, implementing, and evaluating workforce 
development programs that target the COTPER workforce. This office is responsible for  
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workforce analysis and planning processes for COTPER, and assesses employee satisfaction 
through an annual survey. This office also advises on agency-wide workforce and career 
development policy, strategy, and programs. 
 
The Office of Science and Public Health Practice (OSPHP) headed by Barbara Ellis has 
experienced major growth and is part of the drive to integrate science into all that COTPER 
does. The office provides scientific advice, guidance, and leadership to the COTPER director, 
senior leadership in the divisions and offices, and the COTPER staff. The office is responsible 
for oversight of scientific activities within COTPER, and advocates for its scientists and the 
scientific basis of its programs. OSPHP is committed to increasing scientific contributions to the 
preparedness and response knowledge base, and to promoting the translation of science to 
practice. OSPHP is overseeing the launch of a new external research program, and the 
establishment of five to seven Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHPs). The office also 
has within it the Career Epidemiology Field Officers, nearly 30 mid-level epidemiologists who 
are based throughout the country supporting state and local public health. The office also 
interacts with CDC’s Public Health Ethics Committee (PHEC) and has taken a lead role in 
developing ethical guidelines for preparedness and response.  
 
The Enterprise Communication Office (ECO) headed by Ann O’Connor bridges the 
responsibilities of policy and communication professionals across CDC, working collaboratively 
with CDC experts in science, public health, policy, and communications. This office provides 
leadership in managing urgent high-profile issues, media relations, and internal 
communications. ECO also leads the coordination of reviews by the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests, and controlled correspondence. They ensure consistent, accurate, and 
comprehensive messaging across all activities, and are also the lead office within COTPER for 
the COTPER preparedness report. 
 
The Strategy and Information Office (SIO) headed by Stephanie Zaza serves as the focal point 
for long-range planning and policy development. This office develops and articulates strategy, 
aligns budget to strategy, and integrates budget and performance. The SIO also integrates a 
functional framework for public health emergency preparedness and response into strategy, 
budget, performance measurement, and communications.  
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Liaison Office headed by Colonel Cieslak enhances 
collaboration between DoD and CDC regarding protection from adverse natural and intentional 
health impacts; staffs the DoD seat in DEOC, provides links to DoD assets and expertise; 
provides clinical and public health outreach; and coordinates mutual CDC and DoD efforts such 
as surveillance and SA activities. While Colonel Cieslak is housed in COTPER, he serves the 
entire agency as the liaison to the DoD.  
 
Regarding COTPER’s four largest tactical activities, Dr. Besser reported that the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement is managed by the Division of State and 
Local Readiness (DSLR) for which Donna Knutson is the Acting Director. DSLR provides 
guidance and funds to state, local, territorial and tribal health departments to strengthen 
preparedness. In FY08, $705 million were awarded through this cooperative agreement. The 
division provides technical assistance and consultation, and develops performance metrics and 
gathers performance data on exercises and real events. The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), 
headed by Greg Burel, manages and maintains the repository of critical medical assets 
including antibiotics, antivirals, antitoxins, other life-support medications, and supplies. It 
procures, stores, and delivers these assets to a site of a public health emergency; and provides 
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technical assistance to help move medical assets from warehouses to points of dispensing 
through federal, state, and local efforts. The Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) is 
managed by the Division of Emergency Operations, with Phil Navin serving as the director. It 
functions as the command center for coordinating emergency responses to domestic and 
international public health threats. The DEOC coordinates CDC’s preparedness, assessment, 
response, recovery, and evaluation for public health emergencies, and serves as the point of 
contact for state agencies reporting potential public health threats. The Select Agent Program 
(SAP), which is managed by the Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) and is headed by 
Dr. Rob Weyant, regulates all entities that possess, use, or transfer biological agents or toxins 
that could pose a severe threat to the public. It is designed to ensure compliance with select 
agent regulations by providing guidance to registered entities and conducting evaluations and 
inspections. This is truly a collaborative activity jointly run with the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to protect public health by ensuring 
laboratory biosafety and security among facilities working with select agents. This collaboration 
is essential to the success of the program. 
 
With respect to biosurveillance, Dr. Besser reported that CDC was designated as the lead 
federal agency for coordinating the development of the National Biosurveillance Strategy for 
Human Health (2007), which is a part of HSPD-21. The strategy being developed must 
strengthen public health practice, provide value to clinicians, and build upon current systems 
and resources. Dr. Gerberding established the Biosurveillance Coordination Unit (BCU) as a 
way of taking on this extraordinary challenge, and Dr. Sosin has been heading that since 
January 2008 when it was established. A draft strategy is currently out for review, which 
attempts to examine the wide array of biosurveillance activities and identify gaps. CDC is 
currently focusing on the following select programs for enhancing biosurveillance activities: 
BioSense, a system that connects real-time or near real-time health information for public health 
action; BioPHusion, to merge health information with other sources of information to provide 
rapid information for decision making; Global Disease Detection, to build infrastructure and build 
upon existing infrastructure internationally to detect and respond to health threats outside of 
United States borders faster; and BioWatch in collaboration with DHS and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), in which CDC participates primarily through the Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN). CDC maintains situational awareness of public health threats through the use of 
multiple biosurveillance capabilities that are components of a wide range of public health 
programs. These biosurveillance activities rely on a skilled workforce to collect, analyze, and 
interpret data from clinical and public health practice activities; adaptive approaches to 
electronic health information technology; and laboratory capability to rapidly verify exposures 
and diseases and communicate results for public health action. 
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Some of the core components include the LRN, which is funded through the preparedness line 
item. This is an extraordinary national network of hospitals and testing laboratories (part of state 
and local public health, federal, military, veterinary, agricultural, food and environmental). This 
system provides laboratory diagnostic capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism 
and other public health emergencies. Before the LRN was in place, the time it took to verify and 
validate results occurring throughout the country seriously delayed response. The current 
system allows CDC to trust the results received. Laboratories are using the same assays and 
are all participating collaboratively in proficiency testing. PulseNet is another laboratory 
surveillance system that provides the capability for quick comparison of the genetic subtypes on 
a molecular level for detection of food borne outbreaks. For example, this system was critical to 
identifying recent multi-state outbreaks of Salmonella Saintpaul and E. coli O157:H7. There are 
currently >160 LRN laboratories, with 90% of the United States population living within 100 





CDC is also engaged in a great deal of work regarding “just in time” information and education. 
Some of the systems that are supported through preparedness funds include the Epi-X system, 
which is a system used for confidential communication between epidemiologists; the Health 
Alert Network (HAN), which is how CDC distributes warnings about urgent health threats; the 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), which is CDC’s longest standing means of 
health communication that can now publish very rapid communications electronically; public 
health web pages on emergency preparedness and response, including Spanish language 
pages; satellite broadcasts; hotlines for clinicians and the public; and a wide array of podcasts, 
webcasts, and videos on CDC’s website.  
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One of COTPER’s critical functions is reporting, which is absolutely essential to all that 
COTPER does. The BSC will be called upon for input about how COTPER can do a better job 
of measuring its progress and communicating that externally. COTPER is committed to 
presenting an increasingly clear picture of public health preparedness in the U.S. The first report 
was published in February 2008 on state preparedness activities funded through the Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement. The next report will be published in 
September 2008 on COTPER investments across CDC in terrorism preparedness and 
emergency response. COTPER is clearly limited by the quality of measurement tools currently 
available, but has made a large investment in the effort to develop better metrics for measuring 
preparedness.  
 
In conclusion, Dr. Besser compared CDC’s current preparedness to the past. He reported that 
in 2001 there were 115 epidemiologists working in emergency response. In 2006, that number 
had more than doubled to 232. Before 1999, CDC performed all confirmatory testing for 
biological agents for the federal public health system. Currently, there are over 160 public health 
laboratories throughout the country. Before 2003, CDC performed all the confirmatory testing for 
chemical agents. Currently, CDC’s LRN for Chemical Terrorism includes 62 laboratories, of 
which 47 can perform definitive tests for selected chemical agents. In terms of response and 
recovery, for the anthrax investigations in 2001, CDC headquartered its response activities in a 
conference room. Currently, the DEOC has dedicated staff to monitor emerging public health 
threats 24/7/365. In 1999, CDC created the SNS as part of the nation’s preparation for potential 




Dr. Jack Harrald pointed out that faster systems required a different decision-making process, a 
different understanding, acceptance of uncertainty, and a different acceptance and 
understanding of completeness of information. He wondered how that was unfolding. 
 
Dr. Besser responded that at CDC and across public health, this represented a culture change 
in terms of learning to make rapid decisions and to act with incomplete information. Having 
trained at CDC as an Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) Officer, and coming from an academic 
background, he was taught a very academic approach (e.g., ensure that everything is right 
before acting). While they wanted to be right, for the types of disasters and emergencies that 
face society currently, they must learn to be comfortable with moving fast and not to wait to be 
100% certain. In an anthrax scenario in which antibiotics must be administered to an affected 
population within 48 hours, it cannot take 48 hours to make a decision about whether to send 
the stockpile and whether to start prophylaxis. The new systems in place are helping to achieve 
rapid response, but different training will likely be required as well.  
 
With respect to biosurveillance, Professor Sharona Hoffman wondered to what extent electronic 
medical records (EMR) would be important.  
 
Dr. Sosin replied that EMRs would be very important. Based on experience with exploration of 
complementary data sources, information that comes through the health system is the most 
specific and accurate for the purposes of public health surveillance and emergency response.. 
EMRs, automated case recognition tools, and other such technologies to facilitate that bridge 
between public health and clinical medicine are perceived as complementary and enhancing . 
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Dr. Robert Ursano requested further information regarding BioPHusion and rapid decision-
making tools and modeling.  
 
Dr. Sosin acknowledged that they are awash in information and need to better filter, triage, and 
utilize that information. The idea is to figure out how to use the law enforcement fusion concept 
in the public health arena making better connections so that the information available from 
different sources becomes more broadly accessible in a timelier manner. The concept of 
BioPHusion was a priority of the CDC director, who created an Office of Critical Information 
Integration and Exchange (OCIIX) to start a BioPHusion program. OCIIX is in the early phases 
of determining what a fused report would look like, and what tools are available to help decision 
makers examine information more quickly and accurately. Modeling is an important component 
of this effort (e.g., bringing all inter-agencies together to use the same tools, apply the best 
science). CDC is not alone in this work. They are working with DHS and the National 
Biosurveillance Integration System.  
 
With regard to the institutional framework, Dr. Margaret Hamburg wondered whether there was 
a mechanism to ensure coordination of activities and decision making with the private sector 
and other critical partners for preparedness and response. 
 
Dr. Besser replied that the private sector is an underutilized resource and player in 
preparedness and response. In many program areas, COTPER is working to engage the private 
sector. Examples include the DEOC, which has a desk that has been staffed at times by 
business executives for national security that can help tap into some of the business sector 
assets that are available. The CDC Foundation has tapped into the private sector during many 
response activities for resources and response. The area in which COTPER has done the most 
in terms of integrating and working with the private sector is with the SNS in terms of private 
sector enhancements to the system. Moving materiel from its secure locations to states is done 
through private sector contracts, for example. Approximately 80% of states have contracts and 
formal relationships with private sector partners to assist in some aspect of countermeasure 
distribution. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) Forum has been a great mechanism to engage 
private sector entities. HHS has been working diligently to address some of the private sector 
liability concerns about getting involved further. The Preparedness Act provides another 
opportunity for private sector engagement. 
 
Mr. Bill Stephens applauded the stunning array of improvements that have been brought to bear 
on various threats over the last seven years. He also requested further information regarding 
nuclear and radiological efforts. 
 
Dr. Besser responded that with regard to nuclear and radiological issues, there were critical 
gaps and challenges in terms of preparedness and response. COTPER is providing resources 
to CDC’s National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH), which is in the process of 
developing high throughput assays to be used in the event of a radiological emergency. 
However, the assays are not ready to take to scale. Resources received for radiological 
preparedness have been rather disappointing. In the past year, COTPER invested close to $10 
million in radiological preparedness, but it was at the expense of other preparedness and 
response programs. While the President’s recent proposed budget included $10 million for 
radiological / nuclear preparedness, it was not in either the Senate or House budget. While 
clearly this is an area in which more must be done, Dr. Besser stressed his reluctance to build 
nuclear preparedness at the expense of biological, chemical, or other preparedness systems. 
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Dr. Ellen MacKenzie inquired as to what extent COTPER would be involved in response to 
physical trauma resulting from conventional explosions, other kinds of terrorism, and natural 
disasters. 
 
Dr. Besser replied that COTPER would be conducting a tabletop exercise in October to better 
understand its role in that setting. CDC will have a role in responding to blast events, but he 
thought that response would rest primarily with the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
Response (ASPR) where the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is located. COTPER 
allocated resources to a division within CDC’s National Center for Injury Prevention and Control 
(NCIPC) that develops “just in time” training materials used in various settings, and which 
oversees a network of emergency physician specialists in the area of trauma.  
 
Dr. Koh asked Dr. Besser to comment on what CDC and COTPER had done well in terms of 
defining their current and future roles compared to all of the other forces involved in the 
response network in this country. 
 
Dr. Besser replied that this is an on-going challenge. As various systems have been built up, 
there is frequently friction as they grow and intersect. However, it is critically important to 
exercise together, work together, and understand roles and responsibilities. There are intensive 
exercise programs in place that help to do that. In speaking to many colleagues at the state and 
local levels, there is clearly a need for better clarity in terms of the responsibilities of DHS, 
ASPR, and CDC and how they all work together. Continued work is needed in this area. 
 
Dr. Damon Arnold wondered how COTPER would be involved in the development of policy, for 
example, with respect to its role with the laboratories. Given that it appeared that laboratory 
identifications were being made primarily by external laboratory systems, it seemed some form 
of policy would be needed to drive the analyses of the results back to CDC.  
 
Dr. Besser responded that the LRN is a well-governed organization. The Integrated Consortium 
of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) provides some governance in this arena. Certain types of 
analyses will be conducted at CDC that cannot be done at the local level; however, primary 
identification will rest at the local level. CDC will still want to receive isolates in order to conduct 
resistance testing and genetic analyses, but if an LRN laboratory says an isolate is anthrax, 
CDC will take action at that point without waiting for follow-up. 
 
Dr. Hamburg asked what the procedure would be in the event of an agent that requires Level 4 
laboratories.. 
 
Dr. Besser responded that he would have to report back to the group on what the formal 
procedure would be. CDC has the ability to rapidly transport samples by sending a CDC 
airplane to pick up critical specimens. In the last couple of years, there was a cluster of people 
with unknown neurologic syndrome in Panama. CDC deployed a team to assist with that. When 
the airplane returned, it brought samples back to CDC so that testing could be conducted in the 
NCEH laboratories. CDC has BSL-4 facilities to handle such specimens as necessary. 
 












Stephanie Zaza, M.D., Strategy and Innovation Officer 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
 
Dr. Zaza presented an overview of COTPER’s strategy concerning CDC’s preparedness budget 
and COTPER’s stewardship of that budget. She focused on how COTPER makes high-level 
decisions about allocating these resources across the agency and within COTPER rather than 
how resources are allocated once they leave CDC (for example, when they go to states, major 
metropolitan areas, and territories through the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
cooperative agreement). While this is a large budget, Dr. Zaza stressed the importance of 
understanding that the funding is restricted in terms of how it can be used. Further, the agency’s 
expanding program scope and strategic needs for public health preparedness, coupled with 
limited resources, emphasizes the importance of thoughtful and targeted investments. 
 
Some of CDC’s major budget lines include infectious disease (including pandemic flu), health 
promotion, health information and service, environmental health and injury prevention, 
occupational safety and health, global health, preventive health and the health services block 
grant, preparedness, and other enterprise-wide lines (e.g., public health research, public health 
improvement and leadership, buildings and facilities, business service support). Until 2002, 
there was not a large or dedicated terrorism preparedness budget line. CDC currently receives 
$1.6 billion specifically for preparedness (approximately 18% of CDC’s total budget of about $9 
billion in fiscal year 2008). Of that, $155 million is part of the pandemic influenza supplement 
that is managed by the Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases. Dr. Zaza reported on the 














































Upgrading State and Local Capacity
-PHEP Cooperative Agreement 
-Centers for Public Health Preparedness
-Advanced Practice Centers





COTPER Preparedness Resources 
 16
 
As reflected in this breakdown, large portions of the COTPER budget are pre-directed by 
Congress in terms of how they will be spent. In fiscal year 2007, this preparedness funding was 
approximately $1.47 billion. In fiscal year 2008, it was approximately $1.48 billion. Of this 
funding, approximately 91% is pre-directed, primarily by Congress, to specific programs or 
priorities, and approximately 9% is not (i.e., in the latter instance COTPER and CDC leadership 
can make decisions about how the funds are distributed). A substantial portion of this budget is 
not spent on COTPER programs and is used across the agency. Removing the two largest 
portions of the preparedness budget (e.g., about 85% of the total for the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement program that goes out to state, local, 
and territorial public health departments, and the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)), 
preparedness funding by coordinating center / office is as follows:  
 
 
Preparedness Funding by Center/Office


















Total = $258.6 million
FY 2008
















CCEHIP: Coordination Center for 
Environmental Health and Injury 
Prevention 
CCID: Coordinating Center for 
Infectious Diseases 
CoCHIS: Coordinating Center for 
Health Information and Service 
CCHP: Coordinating Center for 
Health Promotion  
COGH: Coordinating Office for 
Global Health 
NIOSH: National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health 
OD: Office of the Director 
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The proportions that go to each organization have not changed dramatically from year to year. 
There was a slight increase for COTPER, as the preparedness budget is COTPER’s only 
source of funding. In contrast, all of the other coordinating centers/offices have funding lines 
outside of the supplemental preparedness funding. As COTPER’s requirements have grown in 
terms of new mandates, the amount kept within COTPER increased. The programs COTPER 
will bring to the COTPER BSC for review will largely be limited to those that are managed and 
directed within COTPER. Projects funded by the preparedness budget to other centers and 
office will be reviewed by the BSCs of those organizations. In fact, several preparedness-
specific reviews have already been undertaken by those boards. That would not, however, 
preclude review of cross-center work.   
 
As noted by Dr. Besser, COTPER’s operational activities include the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness cooperative agreement program, the Director’s Emergency Operations Center, 
the Select Agent Program, the Strategic National Stockpile, agency-wide preparedness and 
leadership, curriculum development and training programs, extramural preparedness research 
program, and preparedness strategic planning. As the division directors would present on these 
programs, Dr. Zaza focused on preparedness strategic planning and how COTPER makes 
decisions about how the preparedness budget is distributed across the agency. Given the 
magnitude of this operational responsibility, Dr. Zaza expressed hope that the COTPER BSC 
would review this effort in detail in the future to make recommendations for improvement.  
 
In terms of funding priorities and how COTPER plans its budget to those priorities, CDC has 
organized all of its work into four overarching goal areas and associated goal action plans: 
Preparedness, People, Places, and Global. The Preparedness Goal Action Plan includes nine 
goals, five functional objectives, a series of sub-objectives under each of those, and a number 
of strategies. The nine preparedness goals are oriented into Pre-Event (e.g., detect and report), 
Event (e.g., investigate and control), and Post-Event (e.g., recover and improve). This 
categorization of the goals has been useful for talking with general emergency management 
and Homeland Security audiences because it is time-oriented. However, one of the challenges 
is that these goals affect each other in complicated ways, making it difficult to use them as a 
planning framework. In addition, the goals are outcome-oriented and should be measurable with 
the right data systems in place. Another major challenge is how to measure performance in an 
all-hazards way, when many measurement efforts will require specificity depending upon the 
scenario.  
 
Unlike most strategic planning efforts, the functional objectives in the preparedness goal action 
plan do not have a one-to-one relationship with the goals. Instead, these objectives reflect the 
core functions and capabilities of CDC (see below).  
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CDC Preparedness Goal Action Plan  
Objectives
Health Monitoring and Surveillance
Integrate and enhance the existing surveillance systems at the local, 
state, national, and international levels to detect, monitor, report, and 
evaluate public health threats.
Epidemiology and Other Assessment Sciences 
Support and strengthen human and technological epidemiologic 
resources to prevent, investigate, mitigate, and control current, 
emerging and new public health threats and to conduct research and 
development that lead to interventions for such threats. 
Public Health Laboratory Science and Service 
Enhance and sustain nationwide and international laboratory capacity to 
gather, ship, screen, and test samples for public health threats and to 
conduct research and development that lead to interventions for such 
threats. 
Response and Recovery Operations 
Assure an integrated, sustainable, nationwide response and recovery 
capacity to limit morbidity and mortality from public health threats. 
Public Health System Support
Expand and strengthen integrated, sustained national foundational and 
surge capacities capable of reaching all individuals with effective 




Referring to a question posed earlier by Dr. Koh regarding CDC’s role in preparedness as an 
agency compared to all of the other agencies, Dr. Zaza pointed out that COTPER feels strongly 
that these five functional objectives grow out of CDC’s core objectives as a public health 
agency, and that these are the functions of CDC that make it unique within the HHS. CDC’s 
work to further define these functions as the agency’s lanes for preparedness will help to define 
CDC’s role and clarify where the agency can act and should have leadership responsibility. This 
work does not, however, obviate the need to make efforts in other areas as well. 
 
A challenge of the preparedness goal action plan is that it is a CDC-wide goal action plan—it 
does not belong to COTPER, although COTPER is responsible for leading development and 
ongoing updates. In fact, each organization is currently undergoing a series of processes to 
define its vertical strategic plan (within in coordinating office/center) that contributes to the 
horizontal preparedness goal action plan (CDC-wide). As mentioned, COTPER has specific 
operational responsibilities that are part of its own strategic plan. However, COTPER also must 
understand the contributions of other coordinating centers/offices at CDC and appropriately 
distribute funding to agency-wide priority activities.  
 
With respect to how those funding decisions are made, COTPER has identified five tactics as 
critical for implementing the goal action plan: 
1) Formulate a budget request through an established process that includes submitting 
information through HHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). That 
request is incorporated into the President’s budget, and eventually COTPER is asked to 
write a justification to Congress for their consideration.  
2) Plan the enacted budget to the existing strategy.  
3) Execute the budget through funding and implementing programs.  
4) Measure performance through an established accountability reporting system.  
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5) Continuously engage partners inside and outside of the agency to understand, 
contribute to, and align activities to the strategy.  
 
Given the time restrictions of this meeting, Dr. Zaza focused on the second step of this process. 
Budget planning and allocation is done in five stages:  
1) Pre-Planning and Priority Setting;  
2) Call for Proposals/Guidance;  
3) Primary Review Process,  
4) Secondary Review / Selection Process; and  
5) Communication of Results.  
 
For the 2009 budget, in March 2008 COTPER began the process of pre-planning and priority 
setting. CDC has an enterprise-wide system known as HealthImpact.net, in which the entire 
agency enters all of its plans for the next fiscal year every spring and early summer. COTPER 
has taken advantage of this database to use it as a way for groups to submit proposals for 
continuing or new funding. Once proposals are received, COTPER conducts two levels of 
review (a management review for ongoing projects and a competitive review for new or 
sensitive projects), with primary reviews using reviewers from across the agency, a secondary 
review process and selection, and then communication of results.  
 
COTPER’s fiscal planning process is unique. No other organization at CDC receives a cross-
cutting budget and subsequently distributes it across the agency. COTPER has attempted to 
streamline this process by examining the types of activities being funded. The first distinction is 
to pre-plan continuing activities and set priorities for new activity proposals. 
 
The first set of continuing activities to be addressed are those that are funded from the 91% of 
the budget that is Congressionally stipulated. The second set consists of continuing operations 
(e.g., funding for the Division of Emergency Operations). The third set consists of continuing 
short-term research or other projects (e.g., water decontamination research). COTPER believes 
that once it makes a commitment to a multi-year project, funding should continue as long as the 
recipient is performing appropriately. However, COTPER takes care to review these multi-year 
projects to ensure that it is not funding something that needs to be discontinued. Past 
performance and sensitivity issues are evaluated to identify how these continuing activities will 
be reviewed once they come in. 
 
All Congressionally-stipulated activities and those continuing activities that are well performing 
and do not have major sensitivity issues are included in the management review process. This 
review assures that activities funded from this portion of the budget are properly planned, but 
does not subject them to the rigorous competitive review process given that COTPER is 
mandated to allocate these funds in a particular manner. Continuing operations or projects with 
past performance problems are put into a more stringent competitive review process. The 
competitive review process also is used for all new proposals, such as the Anthrax 
Immunoglobulin Safety Database that was submitted for FY09.  
 
In addition to pre-planning the continuing activities, priority setting for new activities is led by the 
Goal Action Planning Team and the Goal Champions. This includes Dr. Besser, Dr. Henry Falk 
(Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention), and Dr. Mitch Cohen 
(Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases), who identify the agency-wide priorities 
developing a sequential priority identification from that Goal Action Plan. COTPER then 
identifies those priorities that are most appropriate for the use of the preparedness funding line, 
and subsequently request proposals for those priority areas. COTPER provides written 
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guidance, engages in consultations across the agency, provides technical assistance, screens 
the submitted proposals, and generally has to make numerous requests for additional, more 
complete information or materials that were not submitted. 
 
The proposals that do not require a competitive review go through a management review. 
Management review occurs for on-going programs that have had minimal or no past 
performance problems, and have minimal or no sensitivity issues (e.g., little media interest or 
public inquiry). Competitive reviews are typically conducted for continuing projects that have a 
lot of performance or sensitivity issues, and for all of the new proposals. Dual reviews are 
conducted by senior scientific and programmatic staff within COTPER, using a standard 
scientific criteria review set with review questions. This process is a major endeavor. For FY09 
there were approximately 95 projects under management review, and approximately 80 under 
competitive review. 
 
The secondary review process is new this year. It will include a panel comprised of 
representatives from COTPER, CCID, CCEHIP, and the Coordinating Center for Health 
Information and Services. The merit-based primary review results (from both the management 
or competitive review processes) will be provided to the secondary review panel, which will 
consider merit, past performance and funding history, priority alignment, and priority rankings 
provided by each Coordinating Center/Office. The ultimate goal is to reconcile the panel reviews 
and recommendations and to develop a consolidated set of recommendations for Dr. Besser’s 
consideration. Once selections are made, the results are communicated through briefings to key 
stakeholders; individual meetings with Coordinating Center/Office leadership; and feedback 
given to project officers. Regardless of whether a project is funded, feedback is given to assist 
the applicant in seeking other funding or for re-proposing the project the following year.  
 
To conclude, Dr. Zaza reviewed some of the challenges faced by COTPER. Coordinating the 
budget allocation process across the agency in a rigorous manner is very difficult. It is also 
challenging to maintain progress with decreasing funding. While the decreases appear to be 
small amounts, they are important to maintain ongoing operations and invest in new projects. 
Therefore, continuing to focus on making the best decisions is critically important. COTPER 
continues to have increasing mission and external requirements placed upon it that impinge on 
the shrinking resource base. Developing and evaluating projects that come from other 
coordinating centers/offices is also challenging, as it requires COTPER to exert leadership 
without authority over CDC-wide activities. Thus, COTPER is constantly working to help CDC 
staff improve how they propose and implement their projects. Moreover, it is difficult to improve 
the visibility of preparedness projects not funded by COTPER. Therefore, it is not clear how to 
tie that work in, track it, and make sure COTPER is not supporting efforts that are already being 




Dr. Koh wondered whether the end result of the internal priority-setting process differed each 
year.  
 
Dr. Zaza responded that part of the reason for the shift between 2007 and 2008 was due to new 
priorities from external sources (e.g., Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21). It is a 
challenge to balance external priorities or mandates with internally identified priorities. The hope 
is that as COTPER becomes better at this, we will observe fairly dramatic shifts in priorities and 
resources to areas of importance for the short- and long-term. 
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Dr. Ursano requested clarification regarding whether the $260 million budget managed by 
COTPER included extramural funding outside of CDC, and if so, what percentage was 
intramural versus extramural. 
 
Dr. Zaza replied that the $260 million budget does not include the majority of extramural funding 
(e.g., 91% that goes out through the cooperative agreement program to states, and various 
other extramural programs such as Centers for Public Health Preparedness or BioSense 
funding). She was not positive what the precise percentages were for intramural versus 
extramural funds for the $260 million. COTPER is attempting to better determine these 
percentages through their accounting systems, but certainly a substantial percentage is 
allocated to extramural funding.  
 
Dr. Harrald pointed out that two of the nine goals listed were in the critical area of 
communicating with the public; however, it was not clear how these fit with the five objectives 
and whether they were carried through in any way.  
 
Dr. Zaza responded that this question was raised frequently. Communication is clearly one of 
the most important capabilities in public health preparedness, and COTPER does highlight 
communication in each functional area. There is functional communication and there is 
communication as an intervention. As communication and marketing interventions become an 
increasingly greater part of CDC’s overall portfolio of activities, they are being captured 
functionally within the five functional objective areas. The two major areas where that occur are 
when communication is an intervention and when it is a risk communication activity during a 
crisis. These two major areas do not, however, obviate the use of communication elsewhere. 
Communication is crosscutting, and it is difficult to categorize no matter what the organizing 
framework.  
 
With regard to preparedness funding by Coordinating Center/Office, Professor Hoffman 
wondered why there was a substantial reduction of about $24 million between fiscal year 2007 
and 2008.  
 
Dr. Zaza responded that the reduction from 2007 to 2008 involved funds being moved out of 
upgrading state and local capacity in the grant in order to fund infrastructure needed to manage 
the grant. During 2007, there was a joint resolution for the entire year, so some funds were 
shifted within the organization. 
 
In an attempt to sort out roles and responsibilities and to understand how COTPER has enough 
staff to carry out their work, Dr. Hamburg wondered if others were involved. She also wondered 
if COTPER could simply allocate their funding in accordance with their strategic plan rather than 
going through the competitive process. 
 
Dr. Zaza replied that one of the challenges was that they were attempting to impose a strategic 
process on a historical budget. The CDC preparedness budget was formed out of existing 
budgets the agency already had, with an additional infusion of new funds. Other items were 
absorbed into this budget as well. For example, the vast majority of the quarantine budget for 
CDC is now within the preparedness budget.  
 
Much of what COTPER does is allocate funds for on-going activities. However, COTPER has 
stewardship of the entire CDC preparedness budget, so COTPER is perceived as being entirely 
accountable for how the funds are used. COTPER has streamlined the budget allocation 
process, making the review process non-competitive for on-going operational efforts.  
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COTPER leads the strategic planning process for preparedness on behalf of the agency. Three 
goal team leaders for preparedness, representing COTPER, CCID, and CCEHIP, focus on 
different areas (all-hazards, infectious threats, and environmental threats). A team of people 
from across the agency volunteer their time to develop the strategy. Thus, allocation of funding 
is based partly on ensuring that COTPER is carrying out on-going activities that need to occur, 
as well as ensuring that there is an appropriate budget to engage in some new and innovative 
efforts that will move public health preparedness forward. It is a balancing act, but COTPER is 
continuously trying to streamline and improve the process so that it is sustainable.  
 
Dr. Ursano thought that part of the challenge probably related to management of the issues 
pertaining to funding outside of COTPER. He wondered whether this would fall under the 
purview of the COTPER BSC, the BSCs for each coordinating center, or both. 
 
Dr. Zaza responded that the COTPER BSC is the only board COTPER has, so the COTPER 
BSC would be called upon to review efforts specific to COTPER. The other coordinating centers 
have their own boards, three of which have already conducted focused reviews on their 
preparedness-funded work. However, these reviews do not preclude the COTPER BSC 
reviewing some aspects of preparedness programs at other centers, such as programs that cut 
across multiple coordinating centers. For example, biosurveillance activities cut across the 
entire agency, and some of the laboratory work is balanced across two major coordinating 
centers.  
 
Captain Jim Terbush inquired as to where in COTPER’s programs the individual and family 
preparedness and building resiliency goals were that were noted in HSPD-21.  
 
Dr. Zaza replied that COTPER has initiated work within the preparedness goal action plan 
around vulnerable populations specifically. Much of this appears in public health systems 
support because the action is actually through the grants to a large extent. CDC typically does 
not have a close working relationship with the general public because the agency works by law 
and by authority through the state and local public health departments. Some of the work is in 
the public health system support objective area to ensure that the efforts made by the agency 
translate to populations and communities through those programs. In addition, there is not a lot 
of knowledge base in this area, so CDC has developed some strategies and priorities within 
epidemiology and other assessment sciences to try to better understand some of the risk 
factors. What are some of the population dynamics? What do we know about these 
populations? What are the issues? What are the needs? And, how are we going to address 
them? These would fall under targeted communication interventions, and potentially some work 
that the SNS group is interested in with respect to specific stockpiles and particular populations. 
In the Goal Action Plan, there is a specific annex for vulnerable populations, using the 
definitions of “at risk” populations that were developed through the PAHPA work and on-going 
work through HSPD-21.  
 
Dr. Besser added that in terms of individual preparedness, while COTPER provides support 
across the agency and to state and local public health departments, DHS is the lead for 
individual preparedness. CDC is considering whether it should be doing more in the area of 
individual preparedness, and certainly wants to do more in terms of community resilience. 
COTPER has recently funded a new position to coordinate issues pertaining to emergency 






Mr. Philip Navin 
Director, Division of Emergency Operations 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Mr. Navin indicated that while he did not have a public health background, he was a retired 
Army Colonel, Medical Service Corps Officer. From that Medical Service Corps Officer 
perspective, he introduced to CDC some of the techniques, tactics, procedures, and processes 
that have proven to work for the Army. In addition, CDC has a great deal of federal guidance 
that helps direct what the agency does and how it is done. One concept that has been 
introduced to CDC is bringing individuals together on a regular basis to provide updates to Dr. 
Gerberding with facts, assumptions, courses of action, and recommendations for decisions. It 
remains challenging to get everyone across the agency to understand the process, even though 
the military and others have used this process for many years. A very important effort was to 
help CDC understand the importance of exercising in order to become better at the processes, 
procedures, and tactics necessary to fulfill the agency’s roles and responsibilities in the 
preparedness and response arena. Applying the principles of command and control, the 
Incident Management System (IMS), and the Incident Command System (ICS) on a daily basis 
has tremendously benefited the agency in terms of how it does business and the ability to 
respond quickly when a situation develops (e.g., hurricane, anthrax, etc.).  
 
There are a number of COTPER BSC engagement opportunities that Mr. Navin suggested the 
members take into consideration as they listened to his briefing, including the following: 
 
 Operations 
 Virtual Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) operational capabilities 
 National Incident Management System compliance 
 Personnel Deployment Resourcing 
  Logistics 
 Stocking deployment items 
 Inventory management process 
 Requirements 
  Plans 
 Art of developing response plans 
 Plans clearance process 
 Exercise strategies/participation 
 
DEO’s vision statement is to be recognized as the premier national public health emergency 
operations center. With respect to its mission statement, DEO prepares CDC and coordinates 
responses. The division director’s intent is to use the principles of the IMS to manage CDC 
resources to support public health activities, events, and exercises in coordination with internal 
and external partners by assisting with the deployment of assets, gathering and disseminating 
information, and coordinating and managing the activities / events. 
 
Mr. Navin explained that the DEO had existed as an organizational structure for only about five 
and a half years. DEO was originally embedded with about five contractors in the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS), but was a sub-organization within the NPS. DEO was 
Division of Emergency Operations (DEO)
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separated from the NPS in 2005 at about the same time that COTPER was being established. 
Numerous other changes were occurring across the entire federal government as well, which 
also influenced DEO’s organizational structure, mission, and design. DEO’s mission-essential 
tasks are to serve as the 24/7/365 single point of information entry concerning public health 
threats and events; maintain situational awareness and alert CDC leadership and HHS; 
analyze, synthesize, and summarize all operationally relevant information for incidents; 
coordinate incident management training and staffing; establish and maintain effective 
communications and coordination with partners; develop plans and exercises for the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios; and provide logistical support. DEO personnel in collaboration with ATSDR, 
monitor CDC operations 24 hours a day. DEO has a contract with Innovative Emergency 
Management that provides telephone watch staff and information planning to include gathering 
and assembling daily summaries and briefings. One person is currently on board that monitors 
and produces medical threat information. During a response, the DEO will initiate surge actions 
such as additional telephone watch, duty officers, and administrative support personnel. Some 
key questions that COTPER BSC might assist the DEO in answering include: Is NIMS / ICS 
appropriate for public health? How do we design and incorporate exercises into the CDC / 
public health structure?  
 




Mr. Navin reminded everyone that in 2001, there was not an official DEOC. An emergency 
operations center at that time consisted of a computer, telephones, tables, and chairs placed in 
the auditorium. It was not until after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that serious consideration was 
given to how emergency management should be organized across CDC within an emergency 
management structure in a collective format. There have been numerous accomplishments 
since 2001. DEO has supported over 38 responses from September 2001 to September 2007. 
The DEOC was activated 166 days in 2007 and has been activated 45 days in 2008. From 
October 2005 to June 2008 the DEOC has triaged 73,113 events. Material support has been 
provided to over 1,000 CDC deployed personnel. DEO has coordinated 33 shipments and 24/7 
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deployment support for 18 public health events and 88 personnel, and supported over 1,000 
participants during the January, April, and August 2007 Pandemic Influenza Exercises. In 
addition, DEO developed the Preparedness Workforce Management System (PWMS); has 
conducted 512 DEOC tours from October 2005 to August 2008; coordinated multiple responses 
to low level events; and standardized Do Not Board / Do Not Fly protocols. Mr. Navin 
highlighted the PWMS system, pointing out that the previous system was unable to identify 
specific skill sets, while PWMS allows one to drill down to very detailed information about 
personnel (e.g., security clearance, passport, specialties, skill sets, etc.). This enables better 
personnel matches to meet the mission requirements for an event. 
 
Using an ICS framework, DEO is organized with three permanently staffed teams: Operations, 
Logistics, and Plans. The Operations Team manages the emergency operations center 
24/7/365, including triaging phone calls and providing audio-visual and administrative services 
to support over 200 staff if necessary. This team also maintains situational awareness and 
keeps CDC leadership and HHS informed through CDC daily reports, Health Alert Network 
(HAN), and Situation Reports. The Operations Team is also responsible for rapid analysis of 
limited information with CDC leaders and subject matter experts to confirm / deny an event; for 
conducting safety and wellness checks of CDC staff in an area impacted by a disaster; and for 
establishing and maintaining effective communications and coordination with numerous internal 
and external partners.  
 
The Logistics Team manages property accountability for the DEO and provides logistics 
planning support during emergency responses to include: continuity of operation (COOP) 
events; procures and manages supplies in response to emergency deployment operations and 
COOP events; coordinates CDC deployment equipment and personnel transportation; 
coordinates and tracks specimen, supply, and equipment shipments; and coordinates all CDC 
medical evacuation missions with CDC Office of Health and Safety (OHS). Should something 
happen at the main CDC campus, there are two other COOP sites in Atlanta, one to the north 
and one to the south. Given the likelihood that there may not be infrastructure to support 
personnel in an event setting, logistics must be provided for as personnel are deployed. Using 
FEMA, fire service, and military models, the Logistics Team provides a centralized location for 
all event requirements such as travel orders; equipment; automobiles; meals ready-to-eat 
(MREs); backpacks; tents; sleeping bags; communications equipment; etc.  
 
The Plans Team develops, coordinates, and disseminates response plans. In addition, they 
train CDC / DEOC staff on current CDC response methods and procedures. They also develop, 
execute, and evaluate CDC exercises to measure the effectiveness of plans. The Plans Team is 
also responsible for coordinating with other federal agencies to support and synchronize 
response planning; integrating science into planning to ensure responses are scientifically 
based; and developing Incident Action Plans. The nesting of plans is important to understand. 
DHS is in the process of developing very broad strategic guidance statements to reflect what is 
occurring across the entire planning system that eventually results in concept plans, operational 
plans, tactical plans, and other areas depending on where one is in the organizational structure. 
When activated, the DEO organizational chart is as follows: 
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Since Hurricane Katrina, CDC has been introduced to the basic principles of incident 
management systems (IMS) (e.g., continuity, stability, consistency, familiarity, day-to-day, 
scalable, and transparent transition to event). In addition, the management and reporting 
structure have been simplified and there is functional alignment versus organizational 
alignment. DEO has stabilized each of the functional seats within the DEOC. While particular 
functions may not be needed during an event, there is a permanent seat, with a permanent 
phone number and permanent e-mail address that can be used when necessary. It does not 
matter who sits in the chair to represent a particular function; that is, phone calls are made to 
that functional representative, not a particular person. Personnel are on-call in order to be able 
to respond to the various functional desks within the DEOC. There are three staffing levels: 
Level 3 is minimal staffing, Level 2 is increased staffing, and Level 1 is maximum staffing. There 
are 232 Action Officer seats in the EOC, which is approximately the size of other similar 
emergency operations centers such as North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The level of significance may differ 
based upon the incident. If a town is destroyed by a tornado, their level of significance is going 
to be very high (Phase 3) because they no longer have the infrastructure. However, the NOC, 
NORAD, NORTHCOM, CDC, and / or HHS may still be at a steady state or a Phase 1. The 
significance phase will depend upon the responsibilities of the particularly agencies associated 



























































All emergency command centers have criteria for notification. The CDC has the Director’s 
Critical Information Requirements (DCIR). CDC’s DCIRs which include: 
 
 Disease outbreaks / deaths that are above the base line for the seasonal or geographic 
norm 
 Department of Health or physician inquires of suspected H5N1 
 Confirmed bird / animal H5N1 
 Any chemical, biological, nuclear threats or events-airborne releases, natural hazard or 
water 
 Media interest for any accidental or intentional agent or toxin release / use 
 Vaccine adverse affects resulting in death 
 Food-borne illness resulting in above base line numbers  
 Accidental death / injury of CDC personnel 
 Requests for use of CDC aircraft 
 Requests for SNS assets 
 Events affecting CDC installation activities / operations 
 
These are very broad and probably require a great deal of interpretation, but are enough to 
raise the Steady State to a Phase 1, 2, or 3. Some of the DCIRs may require Mr. Navin to 
awaken Dr. Besser and / or Dr. Gerberding in the middle of the night, depending upon the 
significance of the critical information requirement being met. DCIRs become more detailed and 
change constantly once an event occurs. There is a continuous exchange of information once 
an alert is received that an event may be occurring. This is certainly not done in isolation. The 
DEOC has numerous major partners and stakeholders within and outside CDC, the latter 
including state and federal partners. Partner organizations and staff continue to grow over time. 
When the DEOC began in 2002 - 2003, it had a few contractors. Eventually, the division has 
gained a number of government employee authorizations for Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), and 
its budget has remained in a fairly steady state.  
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The DEOC’s major challenges include recruiting personnel; acceptance of incident 
management practices for emergency response activities; Subject Matter Expert (SME) 
information collaboration and synchronization through DCIRs; exercise development, funding, 
and participation; balancing response activities for simultaneous events; release authority for 
use of CDC aircraft in time sensitive situations; lengthy travel voucher payments process for 
deployed personnel; availability of funding for upgrading deployment laptop equipment and 
DEOC desktop computers, which must be done approximately every two to three years; and 
authority to use appropriated funds to acquire and issue CDC uniform clothing items for 
deployment. 
 
In conclusion, Mr. Navin reflected again upon the potential engagement opportunities outlined 




Captain Terbush pointed out that emergency operations centers look increasingly similar in 
design, but are not interchangeable. With that in mind, he wondered how the time between 
detection and the ability to make a decision could be reduced. 
 
Mr. Navin responded that he and Dr. Besser have discussed this with Dr. Gerberding. Being 
able to recognize that there is a problem is the first issue. This requires having in place the 
correct subject matter experts, people who have the authority and responsibility to make 
decisions, and understanding that the basic fundamentals of decision making are critical. The 
DEO spends a lot of time and effort teaching these concepts during exercises. Separate classes 
and courses are also offered outside of exercises in order to expand the knowledge base 
regarding how to detect and make decisions. It remains a challenge to get the larger population 
across CDC to understand this. 
 
Dr. Koh requested additional information regarding the criteria for triggering activation of the 
DEOC and who makes the ultimate call to activate it. 
 
Mr. Navin responded that this depended upon the situation. For example, recognizing that 
Tropical Storm Edouard had the potential to become a hurricane and not knowing what category 
it might be, he would request pre-landfall approval from Dr. Besser to activate to Level 3 status 
with minimal staffing. Dr. Besser would subsequently make this request to Dr. Gerberding. Once 
the request began working its way through, Mr. Navin would work with the various centers, 
institutes, and organizations throughout CDC to inform them of the activation status and to seek 
the skill sets they would need to bring into the DEOC based on a tropical storm Category 1, 2, 
or 3. This process is initiated rapidly with a simple phone call or email to Dr. Besser and a rapid 
response from Dr. Gerberding. Activation may also be influenced by media attention, potential 
geographic involvement, number of impacted states, potential number of deaths, etc. While 
multiple triggers may influence whether to go to an activation status, the decision process is 
extremely quick. 
 
Dr. Arnold inquired as to whether there were internal plans for COOP within Mr. Navin’s own 
functional group, and whether there was any cross-training between other portions of the 
agency in order to bring other CDC or external personnel in if needed as back-up. For example, 
during a pandemic in which multiple regions in the country are affected, the agency may need to 
rely on other resources. 
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Mr. Navin replied that this question frequently arises in terms of whether resources and systems 
are in place to allow additional personnel to be brought in when needed, such as those who are 
retired who have the requisite skills and capabilities. The DEO is working to ensure that OPM 
and OMB have those processes in place, and with CDC to ensure that processes are in place 
within the agency, in order to bring in additional people for surge capability when needed. 
 
Dr. Harrald wondered what situational awareness looked like in practice, particularly in terms of 
the DEOC interacting closely with the FEMA National Coordination Center, the Secretary’s 
Emergency Operation Center, and DHS’s National Operation Center. Each of these centers is 
trying to maintain situational awareness, which ideally should be the same situational 
awareness, but seldom is. He wondered if at least it was possible to know whether they were 
looking at different situations.  
 
Mr. Navin responded that this is an on-going issue. DHS has a site called Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) that is supposed to provide a common operating picture through 
collaboration. However, a common operating picture of situational awareness is simply not 
possible yet. The BioPHusion center is bringing information together in such a way that one 
does not have to review twelve sets of slides or twelve pdf documents in order to figure out what 
is needed. The organizational structure within COTPER and CDC allows them to know when 
they are looking at different situations. CDC has made tremendous improvements in being able 
to recognize that, and it is a continuous effort. 
 
In terms of reporting information, Dr. Mary Mazanec noted that CDC was obviously going to be 
the portal for a great deal of information coming in from state partners. She wondered whether 
any criteria or triggers were in place, given that they were probably wading through a 
tremendous amount of information before determining when to send it up to the Secretary’s 
Operation Center, the NOC, or the other operations centers. That is, when is an event 
reportable via the pathways that are set up? 
 
Mr. Navin responded that with states, they must rapidly establish a cut-off time for case counts 
(for salmonella, for example) in order to collate and validate them so they can subsequently be 
submitted to the Secretary’s Operations Center. The data is sent to the National Operations 
Center, which forwards them to White House. The cut-off time may also be based upon the 
need to have data in time for a press conference. 
 
Dr. Besser added that CDC places a great deal of effort on improving information sharing and 
flow, but this is still far from where it needs to be. Part of the problem is due to dealing with a 
very entrepreneurial culture. For example, he spent most of his career in the Infectious Disease 
Center where he was the head of the Legionnaire’s Disease Program. If he received a call from 
a hospital that indicated that there was a Legionnaire’s disease outbreak, his group would 
handle that. There was little incentive for him to share that information elsewhere. As an 
organization, CDC is engaged in extensive efforts to educate personnel within the agency about 
why some information people believe would be most appropriately contained within a small 
organizational part of CDC should actually be shared, what other groups could contribute, and 
why as part of the federal government there is a responsibility to share information in a safe way 
within the agency. There are concerns about interfering with the relationship CDC has with state 
and local public health if they share certain information. There are concerns within the wider 
organization of losing autonomy, losing control over the response as COTPER gets involved. 
Therefore, COTPER is working to develop trust within the agency while working to provide a 
service to the rest of the government by keeping them informed.  
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Dr. Terry Adirim wondered how helpful it was to have representative from each agency at the 
various operations centers.  
 
Mr. Navin responded that CDC has numerous liaison desks in the DEOC (e.g., DoD, FBI, HHS, 
DHS, EPA). Their intent conceptually is to have liaison linkage. During the anthrax exercise, a 
CDC representative was placed in the Strategic Information Operations Center with the FBI, so 
that while the FBI was investigating the case, a CDC connection with the FBI was already in 
place.  
 
Dr. Arnold inquired as to whether CDC planned to address cyber terrorism with respect to 
whether potential acts of terrorism may interrupt information flows. 
 
Mr. Navin responded that this is a scenario under consideration.  
 
Dr. Harrald wondered how, as the DEOC activation rate went up and expertise was drawn from 
across the agency, daily operations would continue throughout the agency. He pointed out that 
one avenue is a virtual operations center. Some staff may not be needed full time. They could 
be at their desk doing their day job and pulled in virtually when needed. 
  
Mr. Navin agreed that over time, agency capacity in on-going programs could potentially be 
diluted. Decisions would have to be made by organizational leadership pertaining to whether to 
continue HIV and / or other on-going programs throughout CDC if all of the agency’s attention 
needed to be devoted to a hurricane response, for example. Plans are set forth in the COOP; 
however, all decisions cannot be made ahead of time. This is situationally-dependent. He 
agreed that a virtual operation was one option.  
 
Dr. Sosin stressed that while there remains a lot of work to be done in terms of reaching a 
common operating picture and situation awareness, a great deal of progress had been made 
with respect to information sharing systems, GIS, etc.. The federal government has made 
considerable investments, and DHS is making significant efforts to share those investments for 
the use of a common platform for a common operating picture. The assignment of staff is not 
just during a standup of the operations center. The DHS National Biosurveillance Integration 
Center (NBIC) is attempting to get all of the departments and agencies to place real time 
personnel on the ground there. While these personnel cannot be the most experienced person 
from each department or agency, this effort is creating an important link on a daily basis. The 
CDC person who is with NBIC is helping to triage, to be the focal point into the DEOC, and the 
link throughout the agency. This is a formative neural network that is becoming better trained 
and more expert in making human connections and in the electronic sharing of information 
through common platforms. 
 
Dr. Adirim clarified that the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) is supposed to 
supply the biological common operating picture, and the NOC is supposed to facilitate a 
common operating picture. She thought both systems benefited from having liaisons from 
various agencies. 
 
Dr. Koh inquired as to whether, as they were going through national exercise programs with all 
of the emergency operations centers, the time to endpoint was being tracked in terms of making 
coordinated decisions that are released to the public. 
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Mr. Navin responded that they were. A priority of Drs. Besser and Gerberding is being able to 
measure response time for bringing information in and sharing that information with leadership, 
the state, etc.  
 
Dr. Besser added that at this point, measuring response time is largely aspirational. CDC plans 
to conduct a couple of pilot activities within DEOC that will examine fairly common scenarios to 
determine how long it takes to connect to the appropriate expert within the agency to respond 
back to calls from the public. Being able to measure during real events how the agency is 
responding is critical to continuing improvement within the DEOC. This might be an area of 




Mr. Greg Burel 
Director, Division of Strategic National Stockpile 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response 
 
Mr. Burel began his presentation by posing the question: Whose picture of the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS) would be similar to the endpoint in Raiders of the Lost Ark where there 
is a big dusty place where stuff goes in and gets lost? With that in mind, he stressed that he 
wanted to impress upon everyone that there is much more to the SNS than simply storage of 
materiel. While storage is vitally important, other efforts must be made to ensure that what is 
stored is useful. 
 
The mission of the Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) is to deliver critical medical 
assets to the site of a national emergency. DSNS does this by working within the HHS Public 
Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) requirements process to 
assure that they have the most appropriate countermeasures. DSNS creates pathways to move 
the materiel to the area of need in the timeframe that is clinically relevant. Given that medical 
response is local, DSNS assures integration with local planning, provides technical assistance 
to assure that state and local partners who receive SNS assets are ready to effectively use 
them, and scores states’ plans to ensure that they can be operationalized should the need arise. 
DSNS also maintains materiel in a manner that assures viability. 
 
To fully understand DSNS’s roles and responsibilities, Mr. Burel first introduced some other 
concepts before getting too deeply into the SNS: BioShield and Biomedical Advanced Research 
and Development Authority BARDA. He explained that BioShield was legislation that created 
funding for “next generation” countermeasures. The goals of Project BioShield were to 
strengthen NIH development capabilities; give FDA the ability to make promising treatments 
available quickly in emergency situations; and store new BioShield-funded products in the SNS. 
No money has been appropriated for storage, maintenance, and replacement of BioShield-
funded products although this does impact SNS planning and costs. Additional information 
about BioShield can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/bioshield/.  
Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) 
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The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) is an office under the 
HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). ASPR provides 
an integrated, systematic approach to the development and purchase of the necessary 
vaccines, drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools for public health medical emergencies. BARDA 
manages Project BioShield and among its many other responsibilities is tasked with 
procurement and advanced development of medical countermeasures for chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear agents, as well as pandemic influenza and other emerging infectious 
diseases that fall outside the auspices of Project BioShield. Given that much of their work 
directly impacts the SNS, the DSNS “holds hands” with BARDA in order to ensure that 
everything works correctly. 
 
Turning to the SNS, Mr. Burel reported that this program was created in 1999 and was originally 
known as the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS). The DSNS currently holds a $3.5 billion 
portfolio of antibiotics, medical supplies, antidotes, antitoxins, antiviral, vaccines, and other 
pharmaceuticals. The SNS is stored in a network of strategically located repositories, the 
precise location of which is closely guarded for security purposes. Commercial partnerships are 
used for the storage, transportation, and maintenance of these materiel and the DSNS relies 
upon federal partnerships for purchasing and security. In addition to some of the purchasing 
work being done at BARDA and CDC, DSNS also leverages the capability of the Veterans 
Administration (VA) National Acquisition Center to purchase assets. The VA is responsible for 
the federal supply schedules for medical materiel of various types, so they are often able to 
negotiate more rapidly and get a better price on large purchases of the medical materiel made 
on CDC’s behalf. For security, partnerships are in place with the U.S. Marshal Service. 
Approximately 36 U.S. Marshals are assigned to the stockpile to assist with security for the 
materiel as it stands in place and as it moves when deployed. The SNS formulary continues to 
evolve. DSNS plans to supplement and re-supply state and local medical materiel response, 
given that in most cases, states are not going to have the materiel that the SNS holds. DSNS 
provides extensive training and technical assistance to local officials, and tries to integrate into 
the broader national public health preparedness effort. 
 
In terms of the budget, in 1999 the DSNS had very few federal employees and contractors 
authorized. Currently, the division’s total authorized staffing for federal and contract employees 
exceeds 250. Many staff members are not in place currently, and DSNS is very careful to stay 
within a reasonable number of the authorized pattern. This offers them the ability to address 
surge capacity, and then staffing can be backed down as necessary. The budget line was less 
than $50 million for the first few years of the program. Not surprisingly, it spiked in 2002 and 
dropped somewhat in 2003. Some of the 2002 funds were provided for pandemic influenza. 
There has been slow growth in funding since 2003, with the DSNS’s budget at just under $600 
million for 2008. 
 
The formulary is based primarily on Bioterrorism Category A Threat Agents: Biological (e.g., 
smallpox, anthrax, botulism, viral hemorrhagic fevers, plague, and tularemia); Chemical (e.g., 
nerve agents), and Radiological. Threat assessments (Material Threat Determinations) are 
made by DHS, which leads the PHEMCE to make recommendations about what needs to be 
purchased to go into the stockpile to address those threats. DSNS carefully considers placing 
the recommended assets into the stockpile based upon whether they are readily available in the 
commercial marketplace, and whether they can they be produced in a rapid manner if they are 
needed to respond to an event. Because the commercial drug marketplace truly operates in a 
“just in time” fashion, there is little extra supply for rapid acquisition. For non-bioterrorism 
events, DSNS also holds the nation’s supply of pandemic influenza antivirals, which are 
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designed under contract to be used if there is pandemic influenza. They are not to be used for 
seasonal flu.  
 
There was a time when the SNS formulary process was not quite so concrete or as well-
formulated. The PHEMCE has brought some shape to the way the DSNS makes decisions 
about what is included in the formulary. The PHEMCE is an interagency effort that is 
coordinated by ASPR, and includes the three primary HHS internal agencies: CDC, FDA, and 
NIH. The PHEMCE mission is to define and prioritize requirements for public health emergency 
medical countermeasures; integrate and coordinate research, early- and late-stage product 
development, and procurement activities addressing the requirements; and set deployment and 
use strategies for medical countermeasures held in the SNS. The PHEMCE considers medical 
countermeasures to address chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats; as well as 
naturally emerging infectious diseases and pandemic threats, including pandemic influenza. 
Hence, anything placed into the formulary has been vetted by integrated program teams that 
are part of the countermeasures enterprise. Their recommendations are submitted to an 
Enterprise Executive Committee that makes a final recommendation to the Enterprise 
Governance Board. The Governance Board is comprised of Dr. Gerberding and others who 
review the recommendations. The PHEMCE must explain and defend why particular decisions 
have been reached and why certain recommendations have been made. A final decision is then 
made about procurements.  
 
DSNS’s emergency response concept includes three components: rapid delivery of a broad 
spectrum of support for an ill-defined threat in the early hours of an event; specific materiel 
when a threat is known; and technical assistance to states to receive and effectively distribute 
SNS materiel. DSNS provides threat-appropriate delivery mechanisms, which vary based on the 
event. There are several operational approaches depending upon the type of event: 
CHEMPACKs (forward placed caches); 12-hour Push Packages (which represent about 3% of 
DSNS’s total holdings); Managed Inventory of Vaccines and Antivirals (SNS managed and 
vendor managed) and other medical materiel; and Direct Order Prime Vendor Contracts.  
 
CHEMPACK is a nationwide joint venture program for forward placement of nerve agent 
antidotes. The DSNS enters into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with states to allow the 
forward placement of these caches. The DSNS recognizes that nerve agent antidotes have no 
utility unless they are administered almost immediately, so they are placed where they might be 
needed. There are two types of containerized storage for CHEMPACKs. The formulary is 
uniform across the two, but the packaging is different. There is a hospital container, which 
contains primarily bulk-packaged chemical nerve agent antidotes that must be used by persons 
who can break down the bulk product and administer it. There are also EMS containers that are 
placed forward so that EMS personnel can use auto-injectors. A great deal of work went into the 
design of the containers to enable just one person to grab and move them through a standard 
sized doorway, which is critical if response is to be as rapid as possible. This would be of little 
benefit if it required a forklift, 15 people, and a special door. There are currently about 2,000 
CHEMPACKs in place across the United States. DSNS estimates that over 50% of the 
population lives within one hour of a CHEMPACK placement.  
 
The 12-hour Push Package is what DSNS is primarily known for. This is a 50-ton package of 
materiel that is of broad spectrum. It includes antibiotics of different types and other materiel to 
address a broad spectrum of possibilities. There are currently bottles of antibiotics (300,000 
units of use) for people who might be exposed to anthrax. Again, the containers are designed to 
make maximum use of a wide-bodied aircraft. This load fills a 747 airplane or 8 to 10 trucks. It is 
designed to take maximum advantage of the fuselage’s capability to hold materiel, and weight is 
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distributed in such a way that the plane can take off and land without additional runway space or 
having a fueling issue. Pre-packed and configured materiel are in transport-ready containers 
and are pre-positioned in secure facilities located near major transportation hubs. The plan is to 
rely primarily on movement of these containers by air, but they could also be moved in a 
number of multi-modal scenarios. They are delivered rapidly by world-class transport partners 
with whom CDC contracts. The contract terms and conditions are such that from the time the 
contractor picks up the Push Package to the time they hand it off to a state must be 12 hours or 
less. In the most recent exercise, the Push Package was delivered within 10 hours. The materiel 
are placed in the containers, which are color coded and numbered so that state and local 
authorities can quickly look at these, know exactly what is in them, break them down, and move 
materiel rapidly.  
 
The DSNS’s managed inventory includes Stockpile Managed Inventory (SMI) and vendor-
managed inventory (VMI). CDC does not own or lease warehouses. Instead, the agency enters 
into Third Party Logistics (3PL) contracts with private sector entities that know how to manage 
warehousing and movement of materiel. CDC does not own forklifts or pallet jacks and does not 
have to ensure that people have forklift operator licenses, etc. Instead, the agency relies on 
leveraging the private sector to help manage these materials. In addition to the inventory 
maintained in a 3PL warehouse, the contracted entity is required to maintain a separate 
independent inventory of that materiel. The 3PL warehouses are approximately the size of two 
Super Wal-Marts racked floor to ceiling. The VMI is somewhat different, and has been described 
as supply “bubbles” or “virtual stockpiles.” For VMI, CDC will obtain an option to buy if there is a 
need for particular items. The vendor must then always have available to CDC the capability to 
deliver, at any time, units of whatever is needed. Or CDC will purchase the materiel that the 
vendor holds for the agency physically, but they will rotate it into their commercial marketplace 
and replace it with newer stock so that stock is not constantly expiring and having to be re-
purchased. Over the last several years, CDC has had to write off only about $40,000 against a 
$3.5 billion total inventory value.   
 
The DSNS believes that its technical assistance for countermeasure dispensing efforts is one of 
the most important things the Division does. If CDC has not created the capability within state 
and local partners to distribute and dispense these materials after it is handed off to them, it will 
not matter (like the buses in Hurricane Katrina). Pre-event training is conducted currently based 
upon Version 10.02: Receiving, Distributing and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets. 
The Cities Readiness Initiative includes 72 cities / metropolitan statistical areas. The division 
provides technical assistance to the 62 project areas and conducts technical assistance reviews 
for all project areas at least annually unless the plans are scored at a level below a certain 
numeric cut-off, in which case they are done every six months until that score rises. The 
Division also offers state and local exercise support and evaluation, and offers classroom 
instruction. In 2007, the Division taught over 2,000 persons how to receive, stage, store and 
move this materiel. Satellite educational broadcasts are also conducted (10 have been done 
and 2 are planned) to assist state and local partners in understanding how to dispense the 
materiel. The division is working with a pilot program for SNS field staff, which will ultimately 
integrate with COTPER in Communities, and is an important support aspect to put people in the 
field to help those states having trouble understanding what to do with the materiel. Post-event, 
the DSNS can deploy a Technical Advisory Response Unit to a state in a rapid timeframe via 
CDC’s contracted aircraft. This Unit has been flown in during times when nothing else was 
flying, such as just after 9/11, so that staff could be on the ground before a Push Package or 
Managed Inventory arrived in order to help the state understand what to do with the materiel 
and to help them move it around. 
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The DSNS faces a number of challenges. An ever growing percentage of the SNS budget is 
consumed in storing, maintaining, and replacing the countermeasure inventory acquired with 
both SNS and Project BioShield funding. New BioShield-funded products will be stored in the 
SNS, but no funds are provided for storage, maintenance, or replacement. Lifecycle costs are a 
significant part of any acquisition. Countermeasures are of no value if they cannot be dispensed 
in an appropriate timeframe. State and local capability to effectively dispense is an on-going 
challenge. By 2014, the division estimates that its replacement cost could reach almost $900 
million, with more than half of that being related to the Project BioShield purchases for which no 
money has been provided for that replacement.  
 
In conclusion, Mr. Burel shared how much he appreciated his involvement with the SNS, which 
was one of the greatest aspects of his career, and commended those who originated the 
program. He stressed that the DSNS was probably the most closely examined program in 
COTPER, and invited the COTPER BSC members to offer any input they could for 




Dr. Harrald asked for further clarification about standards and whether states’ capabilities and 
vulnerabilities are being assessed as part of that. For example, how many states use their 
National Guard as a critical part of the distribution system? He also wondered whether DSNS 
had given any consideration to tying in with the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
(EMAP) states are going through. 
 
Mr. Burel responded that there are specific standards states must meet, which are contained in 
the guidance known as Version 10.02 Receiving, Distributing, Dispensing Strategic National 
Stockpile Assets. Training classes are conducted with state and local responders to ensure that 
they understand this guidance before attempting to apply it. With respect to assessment of the 
states’ plans, CDC worked with states and the Rand Corporation to develop a set of criteria for 
development and review of state plans. Substantive thought went into how to score various 
aspects of the plans, and the assessment is being continuously revised and improved over time. 
With regard to the National Guard, various states and localities have different plans to leverage 
different assets within their states. Some do have plans to rely on their Guard if the Guard is 
available, but most also have back-up plans to rely on others if necessary. States are using a 
variety of approaches. While DSNS does not direct states on how to plan their approaches, they 
can offer advice about whether the plans will work based upon the criteria that are scored. While 
DSNS has not considered EMAP with respect to the SNS, it is valid to consider.  
 
Dr. Besser added that in terms of measuring capability CDC is assessing plans, which is very 
different. He requested that Mr. Burel expand on some of the efforts underway to develop drills 
and measure capabilities. 
 
Mr. Burel replied that the DSNS is working with the Rand Corporation to establish drills and 
exercises that would measure capabilities based on exercising and working within the actual 
plans that have been developed. This will help to establish whether the plans are sound and can 
be operationalized. This is also a financial issue for states. 
 
Speaking as a Local Health Officer, Dr. Smith commended CDC for this program. She thought it 
was one of the best programs, particularly with respect to the rollout, that CDC ever developed 
in terms of the balance between direction and flexibility. CDC provides adequate training to 
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state level staff, which is extremely important since states are variable in their capacity and 
turnover is high. 
 
Mr. Burel expressed his appreciation for the praise, acknowledging DSNS’s recognition that 
there is much more to do.  
 
Professor Hoffman requested more details about how exactly DSNS measures the success and 
scores activities. 
 
Mr. Burel replied that DSNS sends a consultant to evaluate the state’s plans based on a pre-
defined set of criteria. The state has those criteria in advance, so they are aware of what will be 
evaluated. While he did not have the precise criteria with him, Mr. Burel indicated that it would 
be provided to the members by the next day. The criteria were developed with the Rand 
Corporation, and state and local health departments to ensure that everyone agreed that the 
appropriate issues would be assessed. DSNS walks states through their plan during the 
evaluation, involving their local law enforcement and emergency management agencies, so that 
this is not just a public health-centric effort. DSNS encourages states to reach out to emergency 
management at the state and local levels. The US Marshals help DSNS create a bridge 
between public health and law enforcement to understand how everything fits together. When 
the plan is reviewed and scored, DSNS produces a draft that is reviewed by the state to 
determine whether anything has been missed and needs to be brought forward. Following the 
state’s opportunity to provide additional input, DSNS produces a final score. States are aware in 
advance of what will be assessed, how they will be scored, and are permitted the opportunity to 
offer additional input before the final score is rendered.  
 
Dr. Adirim suggested that this would be a good area in which to invest in systems research in 
order to determine the best ways to dispense the stockpile. 
 
Mr. Burel responded that DSNS concentrates significantly on the issue of dispensing the 
stockpile, and has done a lot of work with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recently to consider 
various dispensing methods. DSNS is always open to new ideas, and many interesting ones 
have been offered. However, one issue is that often the ideas cannot be operationalized. For 
example, it has been suggested that pharmacies could dispense the stockpile. However, 
pharmacies do not believe they can manage this responsibility because they do not have the 
staff or security to do so. Work is continually going on with respect to new and different 
modalities for dispensing. A possible focus for the COTPER BSC will be to consider whether 
there is an actual or perceived problem with respect to distribution and dispensing capabilities, 
and if there is an actual problem, how they might sort through some of the great suggestions 
that have been offered. Consideration is also being given to establishing an operations research 
capability within the SNS. This has been highly recommended, and DSNS believes it would be 
beneficial to examine systemic issues over time. They have also begun to try to include 
planners. They met recently with Rear Admiral Charlie Lilli, USNORTHCOM's Director for 
Logistics and Engineering, who offered for his logistics planners to assist DSNS in an interim 
phase. 
 
Dr. Gary Raskob asked Mr. Burel to summarize some common observations of state or local 
health departments that have not scored well. 
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Mr. Burel responded that a consistent problem observed among those not scoring well is that 
they cannot demonstrate that they have a clear pathway to people who will engage in the labor-
intensive process of dispensing countermeasures. DSNS is considering ways to mobilize 
federal assets that are in certain areas to try to bring to bear more volunteers. It is known that 
federal employees will often volunteer when others will not; however, that is not a solution in 
itself. Clearly, they must find other ways for countermeasure distribution/dispensing that are not 
as labor-intensive. Although having the U.S. Postal Service deliver house to house is a 
possibility, that is labor-intensive in a different way and other issues must be considered as well 
(e.g., security and safety). 
 
Dr. Ursano wondered whether modeling was being done in terms of different distribution 
networks and hit rates for distribution.  
 
Mr. Burel responded that DSNS is doing modeling in that area. They did modeling with the 
Logistics Management Institute at the outset to determine where to stage the materiel in order to 
be able to respond to various scenarios. DSNS continues to do modeling internally and 
externally with respect to advanced deployment of materiel; distribution; what to dispense; what 
dispensing sites look like based on current guidance; etc. This is an area that is ripe for 
additional work, and more research into this area is important.  
 
Captain Terbush requested further information about the MedKit program as a possible solution 
to countermeasure distribution. 
 
Dr. Besser replied that MedKit is a concept of home stockpiling of countermeasures. There are 
a number of approaches to countermeasure distribution, but home stockpiling has some level of 
appeal. If there is a time-sensitive exposure for which people had the countermeasure in their 
home, they could take it when indicated. The down side has to do with misuse and abuse 
driving antibiotic resistance. There are limited drugs that can treat common infections, let alone 
resistant infections. MedKit is a way of trying to approach this in a safe manner. A kit was 
developed for home stockpiling that looks like an emergency kit, with instructions about when 
and how it should be used. It is sealed in a clear plastic packet. This kit was tested a year ago in 
St. Louis in over 4,000 households; 13,000 individuals; and 3 different cohorts (e.g., first 
responders, a community clinic population and a business cohort). Over a period of up to 8 
months, greater than 95% of the households had not used the kit and people felt better having it 
in their homes. This is moving forward on a path towards licensure, although a couple of 
additional studies must be conducted before it can be licensed. Once it is licensed, it could 
provide another way of approaching countermeasure distribution. There remain numerous 
operational issues that would still need to be worked out (e.g., cycling drugs that expire in a 
year, equity issues, etc.). It certainly is a potential modality that could improve resiliency and 
timeliness. 
 
Mr. Stephens inquired as to the percentage of the budget that was allocated to storing and 
maintaining assets versus replacement. He also wondered if consideration had been given to 
centralized federal oversight of the assets through the General Services Administration (GSA), 
given that others outside of HHS have significant amounts of storage.  
 
Bob Phillips responded that approximately 35% to 40% of DSNS’s total annual appropriation is 
allocated to storage and replacement. 
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Mr. Burel added that storing for DSNS is more than just paying for the cost of keeping the 
assets in a place. The storage requirements for the medical materiel in the SNS are very 
stringent with respect to humidity and temperature control. The storage costs also involve 
managing and maintaining that inventory, replacement value, and other issues. With respect to 
the possibility of sharing space, based on his experience with GSA and FEMA, it was clear that 
storage space was dwindling rapidly. In addition, a great deal of that space would not be 
positioned where it would allow DSNS to handle the multiple distribution models they need to be 
able to run to deploy the SNS assets as rapidly as possible.  
 
Dr. Arnold, a Medical Director for Illinois Department of Public Health, noted that a problem at 
the state level is that they have 95 local health departments, many of which are supported by 
practitioners who are given blanket authority for signatures for prescription authority based on 
the treatment of HIV or STDs. However, they do not want to be involved if there is a pandemic. 
About 60% to 70% of them are not actually paid by the clinics that they are supporting with 
signature authority. This raises the issue of who will sign for the assets once they have been 
distributed. He suggested to the FDA that at the time of an emergency, these pharmaceuticals 
could be made available for over-the-counter (OTC) acquisition. People go to Walgreen’s to buy 
over the counter medications such as Ibuprofen or Advil.. At some point, it was decided that 
these items would be made OTC in order for people to treat themselves. This is a way to get 
around a lot of legal liability. Perhaps CDC could work with FDA to change the prescriptive 
authority. In addition, he wondered whether shelf-life extension issues needed to be taken into 
consideration from a legal and pharmacology standpoint. 
 
Mr. Burel responded that DSNS manages shelf life very carefully. Those products that are not 
biologics can be entered into the Shelf-Life Extension Program, a joint program managed by the 
DoD and FDA which allows CDC to sample its products by lot as they near or reach expiration 
dates. The FDA can tell CDC whether that materiel can be relabeled for a longer shelf-life based 
on whether it passes testing for stability, integrity and potency. The other way DSNS handles 
shelf-life is that vendor-managed materiel can be rotated out into the vendor’s commercial 
marketplace. DSNS is also working with the DoD regarding the anthrax vaccine, given that they 
use it very rapidly. CDC is currently working to deploy its anthrax vaccine to the DoD so that 
they can use it in a proper manner before its expiration. The DSNS will replace its supply with 
fresh anthrax vaccine. In terms of who can sign for and dispense the SNS, the antivirals are 
currently assigned to treatment and are not for prophylaxis. The way stockpiled antivirals are 
distributed and dispensed will be dealt with very differently than how some other medical 
countermeasures would be dealt with (e.g., prophylaxis for anthrax).  
 
Dr. Koh pointed out that despite all of the incredible advances, one of the challenges of this kind 
of work is that the public does not see the extraordinary progress that has been made because 
these assets are not deployed unless there is an event. He wondered if there were ways in 
which DSNS could demonstrate its capabilities to the every day world on a more frequent basis.  
 
Mr. Burel stressed that preparedness is not cheap, and it is difficult to justify purchasing and 
maintaining stockpile assets that they never really want to have to use. Throughout COTPER, 
from a preparedness program perspective, it is extremely difficult to garner funding when it 
appears that nothing is resulting from it. It would be of great benefit if the COTPER BSC could 
offer insight into ways these capabilities and accomplishments can be illustrated, particularly as 
funds continue to dwindle and increasing funds are required to maintain and expand the 
capabilities that have been developed. However, a major challenge is that caution must be 
taken with regard to the information released about the SNS in order to avoid inadvertently 






Dr. Sosin reminded everyone that there was an optional DEOC tour following the close of the 
COTPER BSC meeting, during which members would have the opportunity to hear the 
Director’s closing brief on the anthrax exercise.  In addition, he noted that for the Board and Ex-
Officio members, there would be a FACA orientation session from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. prior to 
convening the second day of the COTPER BSC meeting.  He also requested that Board and 
Ex-Officio members arrive for the COTPER BSC meeting approximately five minutes earlier for 
a photograph.       
 
Diane Manheim covered logistics pertaining to transportation, meals, and other housekeeping 
issues. 
 
Dr. Koh thanked everyone for their presentations, insights, and discussions.  With no further 
business posed, he officially adjourned the first day of the COTPER BSC meeting. 
 
   
 
 






Dr. Howard Koh, M.D., M.P.H., COTPER BSC Chair 
Harvey V. Fineberg Professor of the Practice of Public Health 
Associate Dean for Public Health Practice 
Director, Division of Public Health Practice 
Harvard School of Public Health 
 
Dr. Howard Koh called the second day of the COTPER BSC meeting to order, thanking 
everyone for an invigorating first day.  He indicated that after hearing presentations from two 
divisions, the group would spend the afternoon making several important decisions with respect 
to the general operation of the Board in terms of the peer review process for COTPER programs 
and / or topics of interest.  In addition, Dr. Koh noted that Drs. Sosin and Rowitz would be 
unable to attend and thanked Dr. Barbara Ellis for her hard work on every aspect of this BSC 
meeting.  
 
Day 1 Closing Remarks / Adjourn  





Robbin S. Weyant, Ph.D. Director 
Division of Select Agents and Toxins  
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response  
 
Dr. Weyant reported that, as reflected in its mission statement, the Division of Select Agents 
and Toxins (DSAT) is tasked with protecting public health by ensuring safe and secure 
possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins within the United States and 
regulating the importation of etiologic agents, hosts, and vectors of human disease into the 
United States. DSAT is one of four operating divisions within COTPER, and works with its 
partners in the DEO, DSNS, and the Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) to provide 
COTPER services under the direction of Dr. Besser. Central to the work of DSAT are its four 
inspection teams: Government Non-Federal Team, Government Federal team, Private and 
Commercial Team, and Special Functions Team. These teams provide day-to-day, hands-on 
guidance and inspection services to the regulated community of approximately 400 institutions 
engaged in select agent work in the United States. A Training Coordinator Position was recently 
established in recognition of the need for training internally and for the regulated community. 
The DSAT’s Policy and Compliance Group processes compliance actions and works on policy 
and regulatory documentation of DSAT’s work. DSAT also has a Contract Officer in place, given 
that a significant portion of the DSAT’s workforce is comprised of contractors. 
 
DSAT began in 1996 following passage of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. At 
that time, the program was primarily providing oversight of the transport of select agents. The 
program originated in the Biosafety Branch of the CDC Office of Health and Safety. In May 
2000, the CDC Safety Office reorganized and the program was moved within OHS to the 
External Activities Group, where it remained until 2002. After 2002 it was moved into what was 
at that time the National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID). Ultimately, the program was 
moved to COTPER where it currently resides. While the DSAT program began fairly small in 
size, following the events of September 11, 2001 and October 1, 2001 (the first identified 
anthrax case), Congress greatly expanded the authority of this program. This is reflected in the 
expansion of DSAT’s staffing and budget levels. 
 
DSAT works in a highly integrated manner with two federal partners: The United States 
Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) and the 
Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Information Services (DOJ-CJIS). There are three types 
of select agents (SA). One includes the HHS agents, those of interest to public health, while the 
two include plant and animal pathogens of interest to agriculture. DSAT works very closely with 
its colleagues at USDA-APHIS to ensure that the regulations are promulgated and enforced 
equally. Another important component is the role of DOJ-CJIS, which provides clearance for 
anyone who applies to work with select agents in the United States.  
 
Other federal partners include the Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical 
Advisory Committee that includes representation from CDC, USDA, National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
Department of Defense (DoD). This committee advises DSAT on certain experiments that may 
or may not be authorized for regulated entities to work on, and to review the select agents list 
periodically. CDC also has an interagency agreement with NIH to review facilities of foreign 
grant recipients. With respect to enforcement actions, CDC partners with USDA-APHIS, USDA 
Investigative and Enforcement Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the HHS 
Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) 
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Office of the Inspector General. CDC also works closely with the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) to ensure that the select agent regulations are adequately meshed with transportation 
regulations in terms of shipping these materials.  
 
The Select Agent Program is based on three primary legislative mandates: The Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which tasked HHS with developing a list of agents of 
concern for public health. It also tasked HHS with developing a system to oversee the transfer 
of these agents throughout the country, and to require individuals and entities involved in the 
transfer of these agents to register with HHS. Following the events of September 11 and 
October 4, 2001, Congress reviewed this program and greatly expanded its authority and 
responsibilities. Through the USA PATRIOT Act, the DOJ was tasked with developing a system 
to conduct security risk assessments on individuals who apply to possess select agents. 
Through the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
USDA was authorized to develop its own set of SA regulations that would cover agents of 
importance to agriculture. More importantly, it expanded the depths of the regulation to cover 
not only the transfer of these materials, but also the possession and use of these materials. 
Interim Final Rules were published jointly by HHS and USDA on February 7, 2003: “Possession 
Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins” (42 CFR 73, 9 CFR 121, and 7 CFR 331). Final 
Rules were published in March 2005: “Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and 
Toxins” (42 CFR 73, 9 CFR 121, and 7 CFR 331). Since that time, there has been one 
significant change in the Interim Final Rule added in October 2005: “Reconstructed Replication 
Competent Forms of the 1918 Pandemic Influenza Virus Containing Any Portion of the Coding 
Regions of All Eight Gene Segments” (42 CFR 73). Currently, there are 72 regulated select 
agents, of which HHS has sole regulatory responsibility for 21 and the USDA for 31, with 20 
overlap agents. These overlap agents are zoonotic, capable of causing disease in both people 
and animals. The regulation of the overlap agents is an area in which CDC has worked 
extensively with USDA. DSAT coordinates closely with APHIS with regard to overlap agents so 
that if an entity has overlap agents, they are required to register with either CDC or APHIS, but 
not both. 
 
Regarding requirements for entities possessing select agents, an entity must register its facility 
with either CDC or APHIS for each select agent or toxin it intends to possess, use, or transfer 
and must designate a responsible official. That individual is responsible for the implementation 
of SA regulations at their entity, and there are criminal and civil penalties for failure to fulfill 
these requirements. Entities must implement security and safety measures that will effectively 
deter theft, loss, or release of select agents. A training program must be in place that 
adequately trains staff in safety and security. All entities must participate in the theft, loss, and 
release notification reporting system and are required to report any incident that could 
potentially result in theft, loss, or release of an SA. Entities must receive approval from either 
CDC or APHIS prior to engaging in certain functions including: 1) transferring materials from 
one site to another, making any changes in their registrations, or embarking on new research 
activities; and 2) Bringing new individuals onto their staff who request to possess, use, or 
transfer select agents (an FBI security risk assessment is required prior to authorization to 
work).  
 
In terms of routine activities, there are approximately 400 SA entities currently registered for 
work in the United States, of which CDC regulates 82% (n=326) and APHIS regulates 18% 
(n=73). Regarding the profile of the types of entities that CDC regulates, the largest proportion 
is made up by the government non-federal sector (36%). These are primarily state and local 
health department laboratories. The majority of members of the Laboratory Response Network 
(LRN) are registered for possession of select agents. The academic community plays a 
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significant role in this enterprise as well (30%). Federal laboratories comprise 20% of the 
laboratories CDC regulated, while the remainder is made up of commercial (9%) and private 
(5%) institutions. As of June 10, 2008, there are 9,987 individuals with active approvals to 
access select agents at DSAT-registered entities. With respect to those working in CDC-
regulated entities since 2003, 17,111 individuals have been granted access approval after 
having undergone a security risk assessment. Early on, a lot of catch-up work was done to clear 
those who were already working in this area at the time of the new regulations. Given that there 
is currently a five-year renewal cycle for SRAs, an increasing number of risk assessments will 
expire and must be renewed, which will increase DSAT’s workload in this area over the next 
year or two. Every entity that applies for SA registration must be inspected at least once, and 
there is a three-year inspection cycle. Since 2003, more than 700 inspections have been 
conducted. CDC authorizes approximately 500 select agent shipments per year. In addition to 
routine inspections, special site visits are made if problems are brought to CDC’s attention. 
 
The regulations require any laboratory, regardless of whether they are registered, to report the 
isolation of a select agent (e.g., a clinical laboratory isolating it from a patient, an environmental 
laboratory isolating it from an environmental source). Once reported to CDC, the agency works 
with them to ensure the isolate is handled properly and either transferred to a properly 
registered entity or destroyed appropriately. The resultant dataset has the potential to be a good 
adjunct surveillance tool, although currently there is a lot of bias in this data because one agent 
in particular, Coccidioides immitis, is endemic in the southwest United States and the vast 
majority of reports in this dataset are Coccidioides immitis. CDC hopes to work with this data as 
it is an area of potential growth for the future, and has already revised procedures in order to 
increase the accuracy of the data.  
 
In recent years, some interesting issues have affected the theft, loss, and release reports CDC 
has received. Between 2003 and 2006, CDC received between 18 to 20 theft, loss, or release 
reports each year. In late 2006 and early 2007, reporting of these incidents was greatly 
increased due to CDC publishing a guidance document to the regulated community to help 
them interpret what should be reported. In addition, there was a high-profile compliance action 
taken against an SA entity that received a great deal of press, which also greatly influenced 
reporting. In 2007 there were 60 reports, and CDC expects to receive approximately 100 reports 
by the end of 2008. DSAT has reconfigured its resources to manage response to this increase 
in theft, loss, or release reports. The vast majority of the reports pertain to minor incidents which 
have not posed significant risks to the general public. It is encouraging that this system is 
helping improve communication between CDC and the regulated community. 
 
The regulations allow for administrative actions, such as the denial of a registration application 
or revocation or suspension of registration. There are civil money penalties as high as $250,000 
for an individual per violation, and up to $500,000 for an entity per violation. There is a criminal 
option of imprisonment up to five years for a violation. Thus far, no one has been jailed for 
select agent violation. There is also a considerable amount of oversight to DSAT, which CDC 
welcomes. In recent years, the HHS Office of the Inspector General has reviewed compliance 
for SA regulations in academic and private entities. They have reviewed CDC’s management of 
the SAP twice. The first survey was conducted around 2002-2003, an extended survey was 
conducted in 2007, and HHS recently completed a study of CDC’s management of SA transfers. 
CDC considers these reviews as opportunities for improvement. 
 
There have been a number of recent high-profile laboratory incidents, within the United States 
and internationally, which have been brought to the attention of Congress (e.g., anthrax in 
Texas, 2002; SARS in Taiwan, 2003; SARS in Singapore, 2003; SARS in China, 2004; anthrax 
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in California, 2004; and tularemia in Boston, 2005 and Texas A & M, 2007). Last fall, Drs. 
Besser and Weyant participated in a hearing entitled, “Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: The Silent 
Proliferation of Bio-laboratories in the United States.” At that time, they discussed the 
improvements that could be made in the oversight of this work with respect to the inspection 
process (e.g., movement from a trust posture to a trust and verify posture, and provision of more 
guidance to the regulated community). A Trans-Federal Task Force on Biosafety, which is 
coordinated by the USDA and HHS, was established shortly after the briefing (November 2007). 
DSAT has been playing a fairly substantial role in the work of this task force, and has been 
tasked to examine the select agent realm and the broad research enterprise involving 
pathogenic biological agents; review current regulations and guidance; and identify any gaps in 
the regulatory framework. The Task Force is in the process of drafting a White Paper that will be 
provided to the Secretaries of HHS and USDA. 
 
Recently, Congress has reviewed the DSAT program. In June 2008, Senators Kennedy and 
Burr introduced the Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act in the Senate. It was 
also recently read into the House. This act would reauthorize the CDC and APHIS Select Agent 
Programs through 2013 with enhancements including a National Academy of Sciences review 
of Select Agent Program impacts; additional criteria for listing select agents; increased 
information-sharing with the states; guidance on oversight of select agent inventories; and 
guidance for surge work with select agents. Laboratory safety improvements included minimum 
biosafety training standards, and the establishment of a broader incident reporting system for 
incidents in biological laboratories. 
 
With respect to program challenges, DSAT recently completed an internal entity risk 
assessment of the entities it regulates to identify those which need to be monitored more 
closely. Given that resources are not infinite, DSAT believes this will be a suitable use of its 
resources. DSAT is also working on the concept of an Entity Performance Improvement Plan for 
entities that have compliance issues in an effort to engage entities more proactively in order to 
assist them with any issues of concern. DSAT also plans to promulgate more guidance 
documents, to place more emphasis on training activities, and has been working to provide a 
secure electronic environment for transactions between the program and the regulated 
community. Program improvements are already underway. DSAT has enhanced inspection 
procedures, with inspectors now reviewing a greater number of documents before going into the 
field so that once they arrive at an entity they can interact more closely with the workers in the 
laboratory. DSAT is also working to improve surveillance processes through follow-up activities 
for theft, loss, and release reports. The improvement of this system has the potential to be 
useful in the larger preparedness enterprise. Efforts are also being made to improve DSAT’s 
outreach to the regulated community through guidance documents, training videos (two were 
developed last year through the select agent website: www.selectagents.gov), and through 
participation in scientific meetings. DSAT developed a booth that they are taking to major 
scientific meetings, which are staffed by experts who are available to speak with the scientists 
attending these meetings about SA issues.   
The Etiologic Agent Import Permit Program is conducted in accordance with 42 CFR 71.54-
Etiological Agents, Hosts, and Vectors (Effective January 11, 1985), which regulates the 
importation of etiologic agents, hosts, and vectors of human disease into the United States. As 
with the SA regulatory program, DSAT also works with partners and stakeholders in the Import 
and Permit Program: CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine; U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, and APHIS. Since 2000, DSAT has issued about 20,000 import permits, at 
approximately 2,200 per year. With respect to the future, DSAT has faced some challenges and 
recognized areas for potential improvement pertaining to the import permit program. In 2006, 
Congress passed the SAFE Port Act, which requires a better integrated IT system that monitors 
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everything that comes into and goes out of the US, whether this is infectious agents regulated 
by DSAT or materials regulated by other federal agencies. In order for DSAT to participate in 
this new system, its IT capacity must be upgraded. This will give DSAT major dividends in terms 
of efficiency. The Import Permit Regulations were first promulgated in 1985 and have not been 
reviewed since. Thus, the DSAT is working with their colleagues in CDC’s Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine to update the current regulations. Oversight and compliance must 
also be improved, especially for those who want to import highly dangerous materials that are 
not SAs. While there is already an inspection program for select agent entities in place, there 
are other entities that might import multiple drug-resistant TB, for example (which is not a select 
agent). DSAT is faced with the challenge of following up with entities that are importing 
infectious agents that are not select agents and ensuring that they have the appropriate safety 
and security measures in place. 
 
Dr. Weyant concluded that the DSAT is comprised of approximately 65 to 70 individuals who 
each day work to reach the ideal balance of providing enough regulation and oversight so that 
the critical infrastructure for the United States to respond to emerging infections and SA issues 
can progress as it needs to. This must be accomplished while ensuring that it is done in a 
manner that instills confidence about the safety and security of these institutions in those who 





Dr. CJ Peters expressed appreciation for the way the SAP has improved over the past six or 
seven years in that it has become a much smoother operation. Given that none of these agents 
except smallpox virus are particularly transmissible between humans, it is unlikely that a 
laboratory would start an epidemic in a community. Dr. Peters’ laboratory has emphasized this 
to their community. However, other areas have experienced significant challenges. With that in 
mind, he wondered what the counter-balancing achievements were of the SAP. 
 
Dr. Weyant responded that Dr. Peters’ institution is a diamond in the crown of the SA enterprise, 
which is a model program in many ways. They have tremendous outreach with the community, 
and have not experienced some of the challenges that other locales have when attempting to 
build new laboratories to conduct SA work. Through interaction with the SAP, there have been 
significant improvements in safety and security in this work. Realizing the importance of critical 
research, DSAT is trying to find a balance. They have learned from painful experience that if the 
local community and the larger community are not confident that the work can be conducted 
safety and securely, getting the work off the ground becomes problematic. 
 
It seemed to Dr. Mary Gilchrist that in the public health and clinical communities, some of the 
challenges had been due to strains being deemed more or less potentially pathogenic than they 
may actually be. She was pleased to hear that DSAT was working on resistant TB and the 
pandemic strain of influenza, and wondered whether any attention was being paid to strain-
specificity in SA work. In addition, she wondered whether the registered select agent 
organizations and release reports were kept confidential.  
 
Dr. Weyant replied that this is an extremely important issue on which the Technical Advisory 
Committee spends a considerable amount of time advising DSAT on a strain-by-strain basis 
with respect to what should and should not be regulated. A portion of the regulation addresses 
the exemption of certain strains of SAs. For example, if investigators are in the process of 
developing a vaccine for a strain that is well-documented to be of reduced virulence, they can 
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obtain an exemption through the work of the Technical Advisory Committee. An up-to-date list of 
strains that have been exempted from the SA regulations is maintained on 
www.selectagents.gov. With respect to whether registered select agent organizations were kept 
confidential, Dr. Weyant indicated that this is a question with which they have wrestled 
significantly. Through extensive work with the CDC Office of General Counsel, DSAT was 
recently able to roll out a system by which they can share certain aspects of the DSAT database 
with state preparedness officials. However, that information is shared in a very highly defined 
context. State preparedness officials have to demonstrate that they have the appropriate legal 
mechanisms in place to protect the information. At the federal level, this information is protected 
from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, but once it is shared at the state level other 
mechanisms must be in place. Theft, Loss, and Release Reports are also held confidential. 
 
For the BSC and the public record, Dr. Raskob commended DSAT and acknowledged their 
difficult balancing act. This is an extremely complicated job, given that should no dire incidents 
occur, people wonder why this must be done. Yet, when there is a terrible event, people ask 
why they were not protected. Given this, he stressed the importance of ensuring that COTPER 
and DSAT had the proper resources to succeed in this mission. 
 
Given the recent publicity about who the alleged perpetrator was from the anthrax attacks in the 
fall of 2001, Dr. Koh inquired as to what regulations and oversight apply to those experts 
working with anthrax or other potential terrorism agents.  
 
Dr. Weyant replied that he would have to reserve judgment about this particular situation, given 
that few details had been released. It certainly pertained to the balancing act with respect to the 
security risk assessments conducted by DOJ-CJIS, which is given a fairly rigorous list of criteria 
from the USA PATRIOT Act. Any individual that meets any one of these eight criteria becomes 
restricted from working with SAs. For example, there is a criterion that relates to a person’s 
mental stability. There must be a well-documented proceeding in order for the FBI to take action 
and subsequently consult with DSAT regarding whether an individual can maintain access. The 
FBI has advised DSAT to withdraw access in some cases, so the system has worked in the 
past. 
 
Dr. Ursano expressed concern with using the term ”mental defective,” pointing out that at least 
20% of the population would qualify as having a psychiatric illness on any given day. He also 
requested further clarification regarding “transfer” and how an agent is identified and becomes a 
select agent. He wondered where polonium might fall in terms of when it would be considered a 
dangerous agent (e.g., if put inside E. coli).   
 
Dr. Weyant responded that the definition of “transfer” is a movement of SA materials from point 
A to point B within the United States. With respect to listed agents, the enabling statute provided 
them with a few very broad criteria that are used to make determinations of what agents should 
be listed (e.g., the basic virulence of the organism, how the organism is transmitted, the 
availability of vaccines and/or other therapeutics that can be used to treat someone who may be 
infected with one of these, and anything else the HHS Secretary deems important). The process 
by which something becomes listed runs primarily through the Technical Advisory Committee, 
and periodically DSAT reviews the list and solicits opinions from the committee regarding 
whether something should remain or be removed from the list. DSAT is in the process of 
preparing a couple of Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking to be published in the Federal 
Register that will inform the larger community of certain agents not currently listed that are being 







Ms. Donna Knutson, Acting Director  
Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) 
  
Ms. Knutson noted that DSLR has the same vision as COTPER: People protected—public 
health prepared, while its mission is to provide support, technical guidance, and fiscal oversight 
to state, local, tribal, and territorial public health department grantees for the development, 
monitoring, and evaluation of public health plans, infrastructure, and systems to prepare for and 
respond to terrorism, outbreaks of disease, natural disasters, and other public health 
emergencies. DSLR works closely with the other COTPER divisions, and is organized by an 
Office of the Director and two branches. The Office of the Director is in the process of being 
built, with two permanent employees currently in place. DSLR has close connections with the 
Strategy and Innovation Office (SIO) and the Enterprise Communication Office (ECO). 
 
DSLR’s grants management function began in the National Center for Infectious Diseases 
(NCID) in 1999. Grants management responsibility transferred to the Office of Terrorism 
Preparedness and Response (OTPER), Office of the Director, CDC, in August 2002 when Dr. 
Gerberding made the decision to move all of the preparedness activities underneath the Office 
of the Director. A number of staff from NCID wanted to move into this new organization, so they 
began detailing numerous individuals from across CDC to a program titled the State and Local 
Preparedness Program (SLPP), which then changed its name to the Division of State and Local 
Readiness (DSLR). DSLR was formally recognized as part of the Coordinating Office for 
Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response through CDC’s reorganization process in 
2005 and officially became a division at that time. DSLR does not have the scientific expertise of 
subject matter experts as is typical throughout CDC. Responsible for coordinating the provision 
of technical assistance for grantees across CDC, DSLR has in-house grants management 
expertise and awards 99.4% of its annual budget through cooperative agreements and 
contracts, which makes it one of the leanest programs within CDC. The DSLR’s budget for the 
entire division that remains in-house is less than $6 million.  
 
The DSLR budget has increased over time, with the largest amount allocated to the cooperative 
agreement funds for the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative 
agreement funding to states. The two types of individuals working on this particular grant in the 
field are 26 Career Epidemiology Field Officers and 4 Public Health Advisors. DSLR has a total 
of 60 FTEs, although the vacancy rate is 35%. This division’s budget has been reduced 
because Congress reduced some of its funding lines, so they cannot afford to hire the number 
of employees authorized. The DSLR Office of the Director has four FTEs, the Outcome 
Monitoring and Evaluation Branch (OMEB) has nine, and the Program Services Branch (PSB), 
which handles most of the cooperative agreements, has 26 FTEs.  
 
PHEP funding to states through CDC cooperative agreements began in 1999 with a $40.7 
million program, which for CDC standards was fairly large. By 2002, the program was at $853 
million. In 2008, the budget was $700.4 million in addition to $100 million specifically for 
smallpox activities and over $600 million for pandemic influenza. The President’s budget for 
2009, which reflects a 9-month rather than 12-month grant period, is $570.9 million. The House 
and Senate are negotiating at this point, and it is clear that a nine-month budget period will not 
persist. Including pandemic influenza dollars, DSLR’s overall 2008 budget was $953,656,401 of 
Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) 
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which the DSLR OD received $896,941; OMEB received $7,561,099; and the Program Services 
Branch (PSB) received $945,198,361. PSB’s budget includes the PHEP cooperative agreement 
and the Advance Practice Centers cooperative agreement, which goes to National Association 
of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). The Centers for Public Health Preparedness 
grants are moving to COTPER’s Science Office and Learning Office for Preparedness 
Response. The DSLR manages 18 contracts and approximately 100 individual cooperative 
agreements. Grantees include 62 governmental public health departments, 7 partner 
organizations (e.g., NAACHO, ASTHO, NALBOH, etc.), and 27 schools of public health. 
 
One of the challenges of this program has been its shifting focus over time, especially given that 
it is a relatively young program compared to other CDC programs. This program was first 
authorized in 2000 under the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act (PL 106-505) or the 
Frist-Kennedy Bill. This represented an opportunity for public health to rebuild its long neglected 
infrastructure by training public health personnel, developing an electronic disease detection 
network, developing a plan for responding to public health emergencies, and enhancing 
laboratory capacity and facilities. DSLR was reauthorized by the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) of December 2006 (PL 109-417), with much more specific 
responsibilities for disease situational awareness domestically and abroad, including detection, 
identification, and investigation; disease containment including capabilities for isolation, 
quarantine, social distancing, and decontamination; risk communication and public 
preparedness; and rapid distribution and administration of medical countermeasures. While 
programmatically the grant began as a competitive grant, the Frist-Kennedy legislation changed 
that to a formula grant. This means that the DSLR has a certain amount of money allocated by 
population, so every state knows how much it will receive and competitive awards are no longer 
required. There are currently 62 grantees rather than a handful of grantees funded through the 
competitive process.  
 
Under Frist-Kennedy, CDC was the lead agency for developing capacities and capabilities and 
the program was administered from NCID, with subject matter experts housed there. Under 
PAHPA/PL 109-417, the formula grants have penalties for non-performance, and CDC is 
responsible for the operations arm of the grant program, with significant input from HHS and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The program is administered by COTPER’s DSLR, 
with subject matter experts housed outside of COTPER. Also under Frist-Kennedy, strategic 
planning for the stockpile was contained in a whole planning module known as “Focus Area A,” 
and there was no local planning emphasis on countermeasure distribution; some work was 
begun with state and local experts to develop performance measures; and the focus was 
generally on bioterrorism. Under PAHPA/PL 109-417, a $57 million investment has been made 
in local Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) planning with the Cities Readiness Initiative; 
countermeasure delivery is a high-level focus for HHS, CDC, DHS, and the Homeland Security 
Council; and an all-hazards approach has been adopted, with occasional inputs into agent-
specific activities (e.g., smallpox, novel flu viruses).  
 
During the lifetime of this grant, an entire new cabinet level was developed (e.g., the 
Department of Homeland Security). Therefore, it has been challenging to figure out how to work 
with them in terms of technical capabilities, target capabilities, universal tasks, and 
understanding what public health’s responsibility is in the midst of a public health or other 
emergency. There is not a great deal of science regarding how to do this right or well, there is 
substantial emphasis on pandemic influenza, and DSLR is trying to build expertise on exercising 
and exercise evaluation. DSLR has both strategic and tactical roles. Strategic roles include 
horizontal leadership across COTPER, CDC; leadership with HHS and other agencies; 
partnership development and maintenance; and program planning and evaluation. Tactical roles 
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include the execution of grants and monitoring of program performance. DSLR is aligning with 
as many of the strategic activities that CDC has in place as possible, including the nine 
preparedness goals and the public health emergency objectives. DSLR will likely put out a new 
program announcement in FY 2010 that will align with the public health emergency objectives, 
and which will be very specialized to some of the current strategies and priorities in Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 21, for instance. DSLR also has a responsibility to ensure that 
they are helping health departments build core public health activities and functions so that they 
can function in regular events as well as in catastrophic public health emergencies.  
 
DSLR’s PSB also has strategic roles, including horizontal leadership across CDC, particularly 
with subject matter expert interaction; guidance development; and partnership development. 
PSB’s tactical role is to execute the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative 
agreement. There have been a number of successes: 100% of states have response plans for 
at least one priority; 100% of states have exercised those plans in the last 12 months; 100% of 
states have Incident Command Structures in place; and 100% of states can evaluate urgent 
disease reports 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.  
 
DSLR’s OMEB is approximately two years old. Strategically, OMEB is responsible for the 
development of measures of capacity, capability, and performance; and development of the 
vision for data collection and evaluation. Tactically, OMEB plays a major role in training state 
and local public health professionals regarding data collection and evaluation; interpreting data 
regarding the performance of grantees; and assuring systematic data collection and 
warehousing. The Preparedness Emergency Response System For Oversight, Reporting, and 
Management Services (PERFORMS) houses five years of information from all of the states 
(e.g., every application, budget change request, mid-year report). DSLR is in the process of 
determining ways to use these data in a more productive manner to illustrate the gains that 
have been made. OMEB has developed a program and data reporting framework that includes 
program management (e.g., fiscal accountability, progress reporting, technical reviews, 
compliance), capacities in the form of building and maintaining infrastructure (e.g., assessment, 
planning, training, infrastructure development), capabilities in the form of functional 
demonstration (e.g., tabletops, drills, exercises, real incidents), and capabilities in the form of 
performance measurement (e.g., time-based, quality, completeness). 
 
Referring to the “Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by State Report” Ms. Knutson 
stressed DSLR’s commitment to present an increasingly clear picture of public health 
preparedness in the United States. The first report was published in February 2008, with 
expanded reporting expected in 2010. Data elements include public health workforce; disease 
monitoring; laboratory testing; and planning, training, and exercising.  
 49
 
With respect to technical assistance to states, a key strategy is to enhance the DSLR’s direct 
technical support for successful preparedness and response capabilities in response to states’ 
and communities’ health protection needs within the National Response Framework. CDC will 
define technical assistance success as rapid identification of priority locations where technical 
assistance will be most effective; deploying the appropriate level of technical assistance 
required for those locations within six months of identification; markedly improving preparedness 
performance based on on-going objective assessments; and clearly defining roles for CDC 
assets (people, equipment, resources) at sites of emergencies. 
 
Major challenges faced by DSLR include demonstrating performance; maintaining gains already 
made with decreasing funds; strengthening partnerships with DHS and state emergency 
management systems; complacency when nothing bad happens; changing focus and short 
timelines; and exercising and continued quality improvement. More specifically with respect to 
decreasing funds, of the $335 million for pandemic influenza activities, $20 million was allocated 
to personnel and fringe benefits. Given that this was a one-time emergency supplement, many 
people crucial to this effort will be lost. While exercising is important, it is costly. Thus, states 
would like to know what the DSLR would like them to forgo in exchange for exercising, given 
that they cannot do everything. Thus, the DSLR is continually grappling with several issues in 




Professor Hoffman requested further information regarding outcome measurement with respect 
to how DSLR planned to ensure that local entities are utilizing funds optimally. 
 
Ms. Knutson responded that with regard to measuring performance, DSLR has been working 
closely through the Outcome Monitoring Evaluation Branch with state and local partners through 
the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) and National Association of 
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) to develop ground-level maps to determine what 
should be measured with respect to key areas (e.g., biosurveillance, emergency 
communication, countermeasure delivery, community mitigation). States are provided with a 
guidance document, which includes 15 pages describing precisely how to measure the six 
indicies DSLR currently expects states to self-report. While outcome measurement is currently 
self-reported within very strict guidelines, DSLR hopes eventually to involve program and project 
officers to determine what is actually occurring in the field. However, the program does not 
currently have the resources to do so. In terms of fiscal oversight (e.g., ensuring that local 
entities are utilizing funds optimally), Ms. Knutson stressed that there is substantial oversight of 
these funds. Since her arrival in COTPER in 2002, she has personally been involved in more 
than 70 General Accounting Office / Inspector General (GAO / IG) studies, and six IG and six 
GAO studies are currently underway. The greatest issue they face at present is that some 
states are paying 100% of an individual’s salary under this budget, yet they lend their time and 
activities to other programs that are also federally funded. There is an effort underway to curtail 
this.  
 
Dr. Harrald pointed out that the action plan provided in the Board’s materials discussed the 
development of a risk-based system for improving preparedness capabilities, which inferred that 
the grant programs would move from a population-based to a risk-based system. He wondered 
whether this related to what Ms. Knutson said about a formulaic presentation and what the 
status of this effort was. 
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Ms. Knutson responded that due to PAHPA legislation, every year the Secretary sets a base 
amount that every state will receive, which was $3 million this year. In addition, the risk base 
upon which DSLR is currently working is basically population-based. Although DSLR attempted 
to include other factors in order to develop a much more robust risk-based strategy, they were 
unable to get those approved through the channels. Therefore, while they plan to move in that 
direction, the best formula for that has yet to be developed.  
 
With respect to technical resources, Mr. Stephens requested additional information regarding 
what consideration DSLR had given to existing assets and resources already in the field.  
 
Ms. Knutson replied that the Advanced Practice Centers have a lot of information that has not 
yet been integrated into the DSLR program. They have discovered a great deal of additional 
information that they would like to ensure is disseminated to the states. In addition, DSLR is 
considering decentralizing some of its technical assistance, perhaps by placing individuals from 
headquarters in state and local health departments. They introduced this concept about six 
months ago. Some states responded positively and welcomed DSLR, while others were more 
apprehensive about such an arrangement. DSLR is attempting to balance their efforts and to be 
as creative as possible. If someone needs resources for a short time, DSLR has the ability to 
place someone on a temporary basis. The CPHP program, public health advisors, and Strategic 
National Stockpile individuals in the field are part of that effort. 
 
Dr. Besser added that although some people are in the field currently, compared to other large 
grant programs within CDC, this is one of the largest programs that does not have formal field-
based or community-based staff. One reason for having limited staff in the field is that DSLR is 
one of the few programs that does not take funds off of the top for program support.   
 
Dr. Smith stressed that there is a vast state and local workforce with a great deal of expertise 
into which DSLR could tap in order to expand their base. While tapping into this workforce 
would not be traditional with respect to top-down technical assistance, there could be a great 
deal of value in DSLR finding creative ways to tap into this immense resource. 
 
Ms. Knutson responded that she continually stresses the number of nonfederal resources that 
could be garnered to expand DSLR’s pool; however, they must tap into such resources in ways 
that are appropriate and that do not strain other state and local level efforts. 
 
Captain Terbush pointed out the tremendous capability of the CPHPs and academic schools of 
public health throughout the nation. He wondered what the status was of the CPHP program 
and its future direction. 
 
Ms. Knutson replied that the CPHP Program is in its last year of funding for this particular 
cooperative agreement, and that 27 schools continue to conduct training and education 
activities in accordance with the original cooperative agreement. The amount of funds they have 
to carry out that work is significantly less than last year due to the PAHPA legislation directing 
DSLR to conduct more research activity with those dollars. Therefore, the extramural research 
group Dr. Sosin is setting up used some of this allocation to set up research centers. 
 
Dr. Young noted that the new funding opportunity announcement (FOA) due out in spring 2009 
will be revised to align more directly with the PAHPA legislation. 
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Dr. Besser added that organizationally they divided the management of that program into the 
research component, which is housed in the Science Office, and the training and curriculum 
development components, which are housed in the Learning Office for Preparedness 
Response. 
 
Dr. Raskob commended COTPER for requesting that the IOM make recommendations 
regarding which specific areas of public health systems research should be prioritized. Efforts 
must now be directed toward advocating for more resources for the public health systems 
research effort. 
 
Dr. Arnold inquired as to what feedback had been received from states with respect to whether 
they are able to match funds.  
 
Ms. Knutson responded that PAHPA legislation included a number of new provisions that would 
begin with federal FY09 funding. One provision is states much contribute 5% of the total award 
in matching funds. There is also a provision in the legislation regarding maintenance of funding, 
which basically asks states to declare how much money they are contributing from the general 
budget side to preparedness in addition to this grant. While the matching component is probably 
not difficult, it will be burdensome because it must withstand an audit but a great deal of it will be 
in-kind rather than cash. The cash should be reflected in the maintenance of funding side. 
States are not pleased about having to calculate this information, so it is more burdensome than 
not doable. Nevertheless, given that there are provisions for docking funds if states cannot fulfill 
the matching requirement, it is critically important for states to make these calculations. DSLR 






Dr. Barbara Ellis, Deputy Associate Director for Science 
Science and Public Health Practice Office 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response 
 
Dr. Ellis expressed her deep and personal gratitude to each of the members for their time and 
assistance in reviewing issues of great importance to COTPER. She explained the purpose of 
her presentation was to offer an overview of the rationale for conducting an external peer review 
of intramural COTPER programs, and to lay the groundwork for the decisions the Board must 
make regarding the primary method used for the reviews; the schedule for reviews and full 
board meetings; the proposed process for the reviews; and which of the proposed topics would 
be reviewed in FY09. She reminded everyone that Drs. Gerberding, Besser, and Sosin were 
committed to increasing the application of science and science-based principles into program 
practices. CDC has recently updated agency requirements requiring intramural research and 
non-research programs be externally peer reviewed by BSCs at least once every five years. In 
addition, the policy specifies that extramural research is to be externally peer reviewed using a 
model similar to the NIH sequential review process. 
 
While COTPER will determine which programs need to be reviewed and will make 
recommendations based on programmatic needs, it will be the Board’s responsibility to 
determine the level of engagement they would like to have in the review and oversight process. 
Programs include intramural research and non-research (e.g., public health practice, core 
External Peer Review of COTPER Programs / Procedures & Process Decisions 
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support services). The scope of reviews will be subject to discussion on a case-by-case basis, 
and can include single or multiple activities, a portfolio of organizational units or cross-cutting 
topics, or multiple organizational units across CDC. As Dr. Zaza mentioned, each of the CIOs 
with preparedness activities have their own BSCs to oversee their peer review processes. 
However, it is conceivable that for some of the activities in COTPER’s portfolio, multiple units 
may be convened. Depending upon the program or topic, the review may be extremely narrow 
and focused, or could be quite broad. 
 
Dr. Ellis presented a variety of options for how program reviews could be conducted. The BSCs 
may elect to utilize either workgroups or subcommittees to assist in the reviews, or may use 
other external review groups. Regardless of the method used, reports and recommendations 
should be presented to the full BSC for a consensus opinion. A subcommittee requires one 
parent BSC member with experts serving as SGEs and is subject to FACA, with all members 
serving as Special Government Employees and completing financial disclosure forms. The 
subcommittee method requires a major commitment of time and resources on the part of the 
subcommittee members. Workgroups convened by the BSC would require that two BSC 
members serve on the workgroup and provide oversight to the process. Consultants or subject 
matter experts who serve on ad hoc workgroups would be required to complete conflict of 
interest forms. External review groups may be appropriately recommended to conduct reviews 
(e.g., the IOM, National Academies of Science, or other independent bodies) if a topic is 
extremely broad, very high-level, or over-arching, especially if it pertains to potential change in 
policy by the US government.  
 
COTPER recommends to the Board that they consider convening BSC ad hoc workgroups as 
the standardized means of reviewing COTPER programs. The primary reason for this 
recommendation is that it would require fewer resources than the somewhat cumbersome and 
time-intensive aspects of forming FACA committees. Given COTPER’s diverse group of 
divisions, it is likely that each ad hoc workgroup might be constituted with different subject 
matter experts, which would require more flexibility. The ad hoc workgroup method would 
maintain maximum flexibility in terms of who serves on the ad hoc work group. COTPER also 
proposed that work group reviews primarily be conducted at CDC’s Roybal Campus, with the 
caveat that there may be some reviews that could be conducted using other formats such as 
email, teleconference, or other methods. The workgroups would be convened to gather 
information, conduct research, make observations, draft reports, and analyze relevant issues 
and facts. Workgroups do not make any decisions or recommendations. They report back to the 
full Board, which would then make recommendations to Drs. Besser and Gerberding. The final 
report would be the product of the BSC. In general, work groups only exist for a year or less. If 
convened by the BSC, then at least two members of the BSC should be on each workgroup. 
The other members that would constitute the ad hoc workgroups would be nominated by 
COTPER, with input from the BSC chair and committee co-chairs to ensure that each 
workgroup is constituted satisfactorily. COTPER proposed a schedule of four ad hoc workgroup 
meetings (November, December, May, and June) and two full board meetings (April and 
August) per fiscal year. 
 
The BSC will review and approve how the reviews are conducted as well as their findings. 
Regardless of the method used in conducting the review, the BSC will be engaged in program 
reviews and may use different levels of involvement that may include having BSC members 
actively participate on selected reviews; reviewing the findings of program reviews performed by 
a subcommittee, workgroup, or other external review group; and providing recommendations 
and summary determinations on each of the program reviews. Reviews can be conducted by 
face-to-face meetings, teleconference, email or other means. In terms of minimum review 
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criteria, the overarching goal of each review is to take into consideration scientific and technical 
merits of COTPER’s programs and to make recommendations regarding how to improve them. 
This would include review and evaluation of such criteria as significance (e.g., evidence of 
developing preparedness capabilities), approach (evidence-based methods and strategies), 
leadership (effective promotion of partnerships in the preparedness community), program staff 
(adequate expertise), and future direction (evidence of sustaining preparedness capabilities). 
Additional review criteria fall under the rubric of mission relevance and program impact. 
Mission relevance pertains to how well the program is matched to the needs of stakeholders 
and to HHS, CDC, and other public health priorities. A review of program impact is generally 
retrospective and requires the reviewers to evaluate the degree to which past work has resulted 
in improvements in public health, and whether the program adequately promoted translation and 
dissemination of research findings or put new knowledge into action. 
 
With respect to the end result, once the Board makes recommendations regarding observations 
and the program review, Dr. Ellis stressed that COTPER is highly committed to implementation 
of the recommendations that are practical to do so, as well as to track progress of the 
implementation of the recommendations. COTPER will report to the Board regarding the status 
implementing recommendations one year after the recommendations are issued. In addition, 
COTPER and Dr. Besser are responsible for reporting the status of external peer reviews. Dr. 
Besser has delegated that role to the Office of Science and Public Health Practice Associate 
Director of Science (ADS), who will report to the CDC’s Associate Director for Science. Dr. Ellis 
noted that CDC’s Associate Director for Science, Dr. Jimmy Stephens, had joined them during 
the second day of the BSC meeting. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Ellis referred members to Tab 7 of their briefing notebook to a draft document 
titled, “External Peer Review Programs: Procedures, Criteria, & Schedule of Review,” which 
begins to shape policies and procedures for the COTPER external peer review process, 
procedures, and schedule. She requested that members review the document and provide 
feedback, indicating that the document would be revised based upon their input and 
discussions. Dr. Ellis then guided the group through a set of decision points. 
 
Decision Point (1)  
 
Determine the primary method the BSC will use to review COTPER programs and topics: 
 
 The recommendation from COTPER for consideration: That reviews would be conducted 
primarily by ad hoc workgroups convened by the BSC, with the caveat that there may be 




With respect to proposed meetings, Dr. Mazanec wondered why the months specified were 
chosen, and if it was tied to budget considerations.  
 
Dr. Ellis responded that to some extent the decision was tied to the budget cycle. A full board 
meeting in September would be problematic, given that CDC is closing out the fiscal year on 
September 30th. The months proposed for reviews were to allow the workgroups to work 
through the process and have ample time to prepare their reports that would be vetted back to 
the program to ensure there were no inaccuracies. Reports would also be shared with Dr. Koh 
and others before their release to the full Board for review prior to the next BSC meeting. They 
were attempting to allow for these factors, as well as for the workgroup to reconvene if 
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necessary to address any additional issues the Board deemed necessary prior to considering a 
program review to be completed.  
 
Dr. Harrald inquired as to whether the intent was for the workgroup to meet on-site during one of 
those months. For example, a workgroup would meet in May or June and report in August.  
 
Dr. Ellis responded that this was correct. Although COTPER was initially proposing that the ad 
hoc working groups meet on site at CDC, there is flexibility to use email, teleconference, and 
other means.  
 
Dr. Hamburg wondered whether voting in the affirmative for Decision 1 would preclude deciding 
later to have the IOM consider a particular question. 
 
Dr. Ellis replied that it would not. After listening to the proposed topics or programs for review, if 
the Board suggested that a more sustained effort would be required and a subcommittee should 
be formed, or that it should go to another external body, the Board would have that flexibility. 
 
Mr. Stephens pointed out that other groups that have used BSCs and this process found that 
there is a great deal of work associated with each review, and that a considerable amount of 
materials are required at the outset. He thought it was imperative for the Board to be engaged in 
the most critical issues COTPER believed to be important, and to have mechanisms in place so 
Board members were not responsible for many reviews beyond the capability of the number of 
members they have. 
 
Dr. Ellis acknowledged that all of the Board members were extremely busy and that convening 
at the same time and place and having a quorum would sometimes be challenging. She 
stressed that the ad hoc workgroup method would allow for increased flexibility and decreased 
potential burden upon Board members’ time. It would also allow Board members with specific 
expertise and interests to participate in one project review in an intense manner. 
 
Dr. Ursano inquired as to the number of programs and topics COTPER anticipated the Board 
would review over a five-year span. 
 
Dr. Ellis replied that it was difficult to offer an exact denominator. She referred members to 
Appendix B in their notebooks to a list of COTPER programs and activities, explaining that a 
review could be of a single activity or program, encompass multiple programs, or could be 
cross-cutting across all of COTPER’s divisions. 
 
Dr. Besser added that it would be a great contribution to COTPER if the Board could conduct 
four reviews per year. This BSC is the only group that serves a review function within COTPER, 
so an initial focus on COTPER’s intramural activities was suggested. As time goes on, Dr. 
Besser thought it would be very exciting to review some of the cross-cutting activities COTPER 
supports across CDC that may not have been covered by another BSC. Perhaps there could be 
joint reviews between some BSCs as well.  
 





Motion and Vote: Decision Point (1) 
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Professor Hoffman motioned that the primary method the BSC will use to review COTPER 
programs and topics would be for reviews to be conducted primarily by ad hoc workgroups 
convened by the BSC (with the caveat that there may be some topics or programs that the BSC 
would recommend other external groups review). Mr. Stephens seconded the motion. The 
motion carried unanimously.  
 
Decision Point (2) 
 
Determine rhythm and proposed dates of peer reviews and full BSC meetings. The proposed 
schedule of review and full BSC meetings was as follows: 
 
    Fiscal Year   Month of BSC Meeting      Month of Review  
    FY 2008                August            Not Applicable 




Dr. Koh inquired as to the length of the standard Board meetings. 
 
Dr. Ellis replied that each Board meeting would be approximately two days and each workgroup 
meeting would be approximately two and a half days.  
 
Dr. Peters indicated that his schedule was such that he would rather arrive the day before a 
meeting convened and have a full day the next day, as he could not arrive for morning or early 
afternoon meetings. Others agreed. 
 
Dr. Ursano pointed out that the first topic, “Analyze the end-to-end delivery system for 
distributing and dispensing medical countermeasures and the underlying concerns regarding 
these capabilities,” was a rather broad task that would require a considerable amount of effort. 
This task could involve physical visits to a number of sites or interviews with numerous people. 
It was not clear how this would be done. In addition, he noted that reviewing a delivery system 
and reviewing a program were very different tasks.  
  
Dr. Koh responded that the workgroup itself would determine the issues and make the decisions 
about how many meetings would be necessary to cover the scope of a particular topic or 
program.  
 
Dr. Ellis agreed that it would be incumbent upon the COTPER Program as well as the BSC 
chairs to determine the scope of the topic for review, the number of meetings, and whether an 
additional committee might be required. Budget would also have to be taken into consideration.  
 
Dr. Harrald asked where their actual “marching orders” would originate.   
 
Dr Ellis replied that for the initial topics, COTPER and the programs made a self-assessment, 
worked with leadership and the Science Office to ensure that the scope was clearly defined, and 
this was reflected in the proposed topics for the FY 09 review.  
 
Dr. Besser added that the proposed topics were a starting point. With regard to countermeasure 
distribution, COTPER raised what they believed were the critical questions to ask. The 
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workgroup may determine that either issues were missing or the scope needed to be pared 
down. They could engage in discussions with COTPER to determine whether there were certain 
components of the review that a working group felt comfortable undertaking and other 
components they may prefer to defer to another external group. He thought it was within the 
purview of BSC to help COTPER craft the scope of the reviews. 
 
Motion and Vote: Decision Point (2) 
 
Professor Hoffman motioned that the schedule tentatively be April and August for full Board 
meetings with possible meetings in November, December, May, and June for ad hoc working 
groups. Dr. Peters seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously.  
 
Decision Point (3) 
 
Review proposed process, specifically recommendations that: 
 
 Primarily the reviews will be conducted by BSC ad hoc workgroups at the CDC (Roybal 
Campus) location as opposed to email or teleconference, although these other means to 
conduct a review may be considered when appropriate; 
 
 How ad hoc workgroups will be constituted (e.g., COTPER ADS assigns DFO for each 
workgroup; the BSC will assign the ad hoc workgroup chairs; COTPER will provide the 
BSC chair and work group co-chairs with proposed nominees for the ad hoc 
workgroups); 
 
 How observations from ad hoc workgroups will be reported (proposed by written report), 
process whereby the BSC will provide recommendations, and means of implementation 
and tracking of recommendations (COTPER will report annually to the Board on their 




Dr. Koh noted that the accountability theme running through the last part of Decision Point 3 
was very exciting for the Board, given that they would have the opportunity to make some 
thoughtful recommendations and see them implemented and tracked over time.  
 
Mr. Stephens and Dr. McKenzie pointed out the importance of recommendations being 
actionable versus the standard recommendation that more funding is needed. That is, the 
program must be able to act upon the Board’s recommendations in a productive fashion.  
 
Regarding selecting members for the ad hoc working groups, Dr. Harrald suggested that they 
use the Board as a whole for suggestions for nominees, not just those who volunteer for a 
particular workgroup. While Board members may not have expertise in all of the areas, they 
know others who do. 
 
Dr Ursano suggested the following language for COTPER’s protection, “COTPER, with the 
advice of the BSC and external advisors, will provide the BSC with . . .”  
 
Dr. Adirim inquired as to how many people would be on each workgroup. 
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Dr. Ellis responded that COTPER had resourced a total of nine, although it could be more or 
less. It may prove challenging to convene more than nine people at the same time. 
 
Dr. Besser stressed that COTPER anticipated that this would be a highly interactive process. 
For example, between the time that a working group meets and the finalization of their report, 
there would likely be back-and-forth discussions with the program. There is a major commitment 
on the part of the programs to be reviewed to provide the information working groups need. This 
information would allow the recommendations will be fleshed out enough that they can be 
implemented if the full Board concurs with the findings when the full Board convenes in April 
2009. 
 
Dr. Quinlisk wondered if there would be any kind of input from external partners as part of the 
review process. 
 
Dr. Ellis responded that there could be depending upon the topic and whether seeking such 
input was appropriate. She anticipated that the workgroups would be interviewing partners, or 
obtaining feedback from partners and stakeholders. One of the reasons to have two BSC 
members present on each ad hoc working group is to ensure that there is a sense of tracking 
individual recommendations that may be made from the ad hoc workgroup members. 
 
Dr. Besser added that one reason for the presence of liaisons was to tap into the groups the 
liaisons represent to participate in the workgroups. A working group review of one of COTPER’s 
programs that did not include those who were interacting with the program or using the outcome 
of that program would not be very useful.  
 
Dr. Peters inquired as to whether there would be a budget to bring particular stakeholders to a 
particular place for working group members to speak with them. For example, he wondered 
whether a group with an arrangement with CDC may have a budget for such a meeting. 
 
Dr. Ellis responded that if an ad hoc working group determined that it would be important to 
interview stakeholders or partners, COTPER would bring those partners in subject to the 
availability of funds. 
 
It seemed to Dr. Raskob that as part of the process, COTPER and the assigned chair and co-
chair for a particular workgroup should feel free to call on any of the liaisons or other groups to 
tap into the organizations to pull in expertise relevant to the topic.  
 
With regard to discussions about the possibility of potential meetings elsewhere, Dr. Hoffman 
pointed out that it was likely that the selection of the Roybal Campus was to reduce the burden 
with respect to meeting organization.   
 
Dr. Ellis replied that all of COTPER’s programs are on the Roybal Campus, which was the 
primary reason for selecting it as the location for face-to-face meetings.  
 
Dr. Besser added that while there should be flexibility in the decision in order to avoid having to 
re-vote at a later time, it would be difficult as a rule from a logistical perspective to support 
meetings elsewhere. Nevertheless, a situation may arise in which a workgroup may need to 
meet at a stockpile site, at a location in conjunction with another meeting taking place, or in D.C. 
if the hub of activity was there.  
 
Motion and Vote: Decision Point (3), Part A 
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Professor Hoffman motioned that the physical meetings of the ad hoc workgroups would be 
conducted primarily at CDC’s Roybal Campus. Dr. Muckstadt seconded the motion. The motion 
carried unanimously.  
 
 
Motion and Vote: Decision Point (3), Part B 
 
Professor Hoffman motioned that the BSC ad hoc workgroups will be constituted with the 
following roles and responsibilities: COTPER Associate Director for Science (ADS) will assign 
the Designated Federal Official (DFO) for each workgroup; the BSC will assign the ad hoc 
workgroup chairs; COTPER, with the advice of the BSC and BSC liaisons, will provide the BSC 
chair and co-chair with proposed nominees for the ad hoc workgroups. Mr. Stephens seconded 
the motion. The motion carried unanimously.  
 
 
Motion and Vote: Decision Point (3), Part C1 
 
Professor Hoffman motioned that the ad hoc workgroups will report their findings to the BSC 




Motion and Vote: Decision Point (3), Part C2 
 
Professor Hoffman motioned that COTPER’s ADS is responsible for tracking the 
implementations of the recommendations and that the progress of the implementations will be 
reported to the full board annually. Dr. Muckstadt seconded the motion. The motion carried 
unanimously.  
 
Decision Point (4) 
 
Review initial proposed criteria for those programs that the BSC will peer review (Appendix A): It 
was recommended that the BSC agree that each ad hoc workgroup use Appendix A provided in 
the notebook as guidance, but clearly delineate and be able to articulate what criteria they used 
in the review. This was proposed in order to allow versatility in the reviews, because depending 
upon the program, there could be some criteria that may be more specific for particular program 
areas. The criteria are primarily based on the CDC guidance that Dr. Jimmie Stephens and the 
Office of the Chief Science Officer articulated in a draft that had not been finalized at the time of 
this meeting. The primary initiative and framework for conducting the reviews is to consider the 
scientific and technical merits of the program and / or cross-cutting areas and mission relevance 
and program impact retrospectively. While the materials provided to panelists in Appendix A 
differed slightly (significance, approach, mission relevance and program impact as appropriate, 
program staff, and future direction), it was noted that they could all be shaped under these three 








Dr. Stephens replied that they had. However, he thought the issues before the COTPER BSC 
were going to be somewhat different because the nature of the COTPER programs differed 
from others. Other BSCs are reviewing topics that are a mixture of a heavy dose of internal 
research plus programs. With that in mind, he suggested maintaining flexibility in terms of what 
set of criteria made the most sense.  
 
Dr. Hamburg found the criteria suggested to be comprehensive, but suggested a more concrete 
focus on whether a program most effectively utilizes available resources and partners, and 
enables broader connectedness and / or coordination. 
 
For Dr. Ursano, this raised the question of how an area for review would come to the Board 
initially. This was reminiscent to him in many ways of an IOM approach, which usually came 
with a description of the problem and the questions being asked. That allowed for what might be 
the standard tasks for 90% of what came before them, but there might be unique issues as well. 
He wondered whether they were approving the criteria forevermore or if these were relevant 
criteria to be considered as a starting point when areas were identified for review. For example, 
they might be asked to review the interface among three programs all relevant to accomplishing 
a common goal, in which case the criteria might be quite different. 
 
Dr. Ellis replied that these represented the minimum criteria, looking substantively to the 
scientific and technical merits of the program, mission relevance, and program impact.  
 
Dr. Hamburg found the proposed criteria to offer a useful framework for thinking about key 
aspects of topics and programs. Obviously, not all of these would apply to all reviews 
undertaken. She cautioned that they not lock themselves into some type of metric that ultimately 
would make their efforts not useful. 
 
It appeared to Dr. Ursano the commitment to each of the workgroups from internal staffing 
would be substantial, so he wondered whether there was a plan to dedicate an office or several 
staff members fulltime this effort. 
 
Dr. Ellis responded that there were such plans in place. It is a substantial commitment on the 
part of the programs to participate in these reviews as well. 
 
Dr. Mazanec emphasized that the proposed criteria should serve as a guide, particularly given 
that some of the wording in the questions posed need further clarification and definitions.  
 
Dr. Besser stressed that a workgroup could not likely use the proposed criteria as a checklist, 
given that the five program areas COTPER was asking the Board to consider were very 
different qualitatively. How these questions would apply and which would apply would vary. 
 
Mr. Stephens wondered in which of these areas anticipated or projected budgets or financials 
were covered in terms of the overall impact. This also relates to adequacy, sustainability, and 
feasibility. There is an interlinking between the performance goals and the reality of the financial 
piece. For example, a working group might recommend either a re-allocation of funds or 
changing the scope of the program to make sure that they have achieved the criteria included. 
 
Dr. Ellis replied that some of these issues covered some issues in program impact, although it 
does not speak specifically to the budget issue. She agreed that this is not intended to be a 
checklist, and indicated that it could be revised to clearly reflect budget issues.  
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Dr. Besser added that he would find it useful if workgroups took into consideration whether 
resources are appropriate for the mission a program has, and if not, what advice the workgroup 
would offer with respect to prioritization of activities.  
 
Motion and Vote: Decision Point (4) 
 
Professor Hoffman motioned that that the working groups use as a starting point the criteria 
delineated in Appendix A under Tab 7, though they will have to refine the criteria as appropriate. 
Mr. Stephens seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously.  
 
Decision Point (5) 
 
Review proposed topics for peer review in FY09 and determine which COTPER programs will 
be peer reviewed by the BSC and in which order. Potential topics: 
 
1. Medical Countermeasure Delivery (Distribution and Dispensing) Capability (DSNS) 
2. Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) (DEO) 
3. CDC Emergency Response Plan Exercise Program (DEO) 
4. Allocation Process for CDC’s “Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response” 
Budget (OD/SIO) 
5. Technical Assistance for Preparedness and Response (DSLR lead) 
 
To set the stage for the discussion and vote for Decision Point 5, Dr. Koh invited the division 
leaders to share additional insights into what some of the issues / tasks of the workgroups might 
entail. He explained that the charge to the board was to deliberate which of the potential topic 
areas they would select as the first two to four that would be most appropriate for the ad hoc 
workgroups to review during FY09.  
  
Dr. Mark Wooster 
(Filling in for Mr. Phillip Navin) 
Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) 
 
Dr. Wooster thought it fortunate that the BSC meeting was convened during both a real 
response (e.g., Hurricane Eduard) and the choreographed chaos of a full-scale anthrax 
exercise. Looking at the Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) as a system without 
these activities going on would be difficult to imagine. DEO would like the BSC to assess the 
DEOC from a systems perspective, either as a whole system or as a subset of that system, 
such as the Operations Department within the entire IMS structure. Another way to assess the 
DEOC would be by considering whether the IMS structure as a standardized format across all 
emergency response was the right structure for a public health emergency response center. A 
third possibility would be to assess the DEOC with respect to the interface between CDC’s 
traditional mission of public health response (e.g., having to make decisions and act based upon 
a high level of uncertainty) and the more academic response of having to have all the 
information before making the decision. DEO proposed very specific areas in which they 
believed the Board could truly engage to help the Division determine how they could do their job 
of response more effectively, how they could become more effective at integration of the public 
health mission and the response mission at CDC, and how they could merge the gap between 
response and academic public health. DEOC would like input regarding how they could best 
use the exercise process to bring CDC together to focus on CDC’s public health response 
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mission, and whether they are conducting themselves in accordance with DHS and HHS 
policies and procedures.  
 
Ms. Donna Knutson 
Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) 
 
Ms. Knutson indicated that the DSLR proposed that the Board help them with technical 
assistance advice in terms of whether there is a better model for technical assistance than the 
one currently being used (e.g., gathering individuals from throughout the agency to go to states 
to identify technical assistance needs), and a better way to increase the pool of available 
resources to provide technical assistance. What are the advantages and / or disadvantage to 
having CDC staff go to places versus having individuals assigned to the states full time? DSLR 
would like to better understand how to evaluate whether the way they allocate their resources is 
actually improving preparedness for each of the state and local health departments. 
 
Dr. Stephanie Zaza 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) 
 
Regarding the topic of the fiscal allocations process for CDC’s “Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness and Response” Budget (OD / SIO), Dr. Zaza pointed out that the purpose of an 
annual peer review of this process would help COTPER think through the validity, reliability, and 
transparency of this process and to make improvements or major overhauls in either direction. 
Their initial questions are focused on the process itself, and whether the results of that process 
are as strategic as they could be, given the various constraints she reported during her 
presentation the previous day.  
 
Mr. Greg Burel 
Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) 
 
With respect to medical countermeasure delivery (distribution and dispensing) capability, Mr. 
Burel pointed out that a major issue is the perception, real or not, that the entire delivery 
framework from the time materiel leaves CDC, until the time it is actually distributed to the 
person in need, may be too long or may not be able to accomplish certain objectives. There are 
distinct phases of this process, and most of the suggestions have essentially been the result of 
brainstorming sessions. However, none of these efforts has considered the entire process. It 
does not help to shorten the first phase if that does not ultimately get anything to anybody any 
quicker. DSNS would like for the Board to assess what the program is currently doing, help 
them determine how to better communicate their capabilities, and make that information very 
concrete in order to help everyone understand what can or cannot happen in reality. It is 
important to identify the gaps in their capabilities and to better understand how to target the 






Professor Hoffman pointed out that some of the areas were very CDC-specific, such as 
budgets, while other issues seemed far more general and ambitious. In addition, other work is 
being done in some areas such as countermeasures (e.g., an IOM study). She inquired as to 
how they would ensure that the BSC was not duplicating efforts. 
 
Dr. Adirim inquired as to whether they were to review the programs or the processes the 
programs run.  
 
Dr. Ellis responded that it could be programs or processes depending upon what the program’s 
needs are. What they had just heard from the division directors regarded issues that continue to 
arise, and need thoughtful response.  
 
Dr. Besser added that each of the proposed topics could be cast very widely. Most of these 
topics, with the exception of CDC’s “Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response” 
Budget, are being dealt with in some way by other groups. However, as a workgroup is being 
formed and is learning about the terrain, the perspective that these other reviews are taking is 
different. There are questions that remain for CDC from a programmatic perspective that would 
not be duplicative of other efforts. Many groups are examining countermeasure distribution, but 
there are specific questions related to the COTPER programs that would benefit from a review 
by the COTPER BSC. All of the proposed topics are areas which would benefit greatly from 
BSC input. Given that they cannot review everything at once, achieving some real success with 
the first couple topics would be valuable. Dr. Besser stressed that the information provided 
about the proposed topics in the members’ packets was essentially a teaser to initiate 
conversation around a more focused approach.  
 
Given the range and scope of the topics and the potential limitations of the Board’s capabilities 
and capacity, Dr. Ursano suggested that each program undergo a self-study with outside 
consultants who are funded. He was thinking particularly of the DEOC, given that no one on the 
Board runs an operational center. If DoD, HHS, and DHS have assessed the DEOC program, 
for example, the Board could begin by reviewing those assessments. The Board would then 
review the self-study and perhaps submit it to four other DEOC’s for their input. 
 
Dr. Peters pointed out that given the importance of the proposed topics, one of the most 
important roles the Board could play would be to help garner better resources by highlighting 
areas in which the resources are insufficient. He supported the area of countermeasures, given 
that pills matter very little unless they are distributed to the people who need them. While a 
number of ideas have been suggested, the proposal that made the most sense to him was to 
have the postal workers serve as distributors. However, it is not clear whether postal workers 
will want to do so or how they will be guarded. 
 
Dr. Raskob suggested that the Board seek input from the liaison members. From his 
perspective as someone working out in the field, his suggested priorities were 1, 3, and 5. If he 
had to narrow it to two, he would suggest 1 and 5. 
 
Dr. Hamburg agreed that the Board could make a significant contribution to 1 and 5. She also 
raised the nuclear / radiological issue, expressing her discomfort with the Board not addressing 
it, given that there would likely be an expectation that there would be expertise in that area.  
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Dr. Besser responded that the nuclear / radiological area was a cross-cutting issue, which would 
be interesting to address across BSCs. The primary focus for those programs at CDC is in the 
National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH). This is a cross-cutting issue because it falls 
within preparedness work overall in terms of goal action planning and identifying gaps, and in 
terms of resource allocation to various scenarios. While he did not know whether NCEH’s BSC 
had reviewed that program or what stage they were with preparedness, they identified primary 
gaps and put forward a proposed budget for those activities.  
 
Mr. Stephens inquired as to how NCEH was tying that back into state and local preparedness, 
overseen key COTPER programs. 
 
Dr. Besser replied that at this point, it was primarily through All-Hazards and examining the 
functional areas that cut across. On the laboratory side, NCEH is developing assays that would 
hopefully become part of a laboratory response network for nuclear / radiological issues. 
However, this effort remains in the developmental stage because the assays are not ready to 
take to scale. 
 
Mr. Stephens pointed out that biosurveillance was another cross-cutting area in which they 
might interact with other BSCs, given that some of the areas are closely and critically tied into 
some of the activities that the COTPER programs oversee and administer. 
 
Dr. Ellis responded that a subcommittee was being formed through the Advisory Committee to 
the Director of CDC specifically regarding biosurveillance activities, which planned to meet the 
following week. The committee members will divide into eight task forces to deal with different 
aspects of biosurveillance and implementation of the biosurveillance strategy that Dr. Sosin and 
his group have been working on. In response to Dr. Stephens’ inquiry regarding whether this 
group would report to the COTPER BSC, Dr. Ellis said she expected that they would make 
recommendations and develop reports.  
 
Dr. Koh added that his understanding was that it was within the purview of the COTPER BSC to 
request presentations on topics such as that. 
 
Dr. Harrald pointed out that the way the second priority was written steered him in the wrong 
direction. The DEOC is a physical place on which a lot of money has been spent; therefore, it is 
obviously not very interesting to comment on how well or not it has done. The broader question 
for the Board to address would regard the decision and the information management processes.  
 
Dr. Koh suggested rephrasing Topic 2. 
 
While from a public health director’s stand point Dr. Arnold acknowledged that 1 and 5 were 
important, he thought 3 (CDC Emergency Response Plan Exercise Program) was extremely 
important due to increasing community-engagement in the preparedness effort, particularly 
through exercises. He pointed out that there were issues of disparity with regard to the 
composition of the Board and assessment of community factors (e.g., there are no neonates, 
people with disabilities, or those from different ethnic groups). By prioritizing 3, he saw the 
possibility of developing potential partnerships with the private sector, community-based 
organizations, people in faith-based communities, etc. He stressed that one of the positive 
points in terms of community engagement was their ability to affect the legislative process as a 
voting pool and to force legislators to address the issues brought forward on the public health 
agenda. This in turn can have a positive impact on budgetary strength. For example, due to 
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people speaking on their behalf, his agency was the only one which did not experience budget 
cuts this year, although every other agency had a 4% to 5% budget cut.   
 
Dr. Wooster agreed that determining better ways of exercising and the ability to respond to local 
populations would be a beneficial contribution from the BSC. 
 
Dr. Adirim agreed with Dr. Harrald that examining the decision making process was doable, 
while 1 and 5 were major, broad topics that would be much more difficult. Perhaps starting with 
those things that were do-able and that were priorities of the agency would be the best course. 
 
Dr. Smith pointed out that without a strategic approach to how budgeting is done, COTPER 
would never be resistant to chasing the disease of the week or be able to stand up to a strategic 
plan which they had very carefully thought out. It would be a shame for all of the programmatic 
efforts to fall prey to the whims of budgets.  
 
Dr. Hamburg agreed that budget was extremely important in driving priorities and engaging a 
set of critical players. She thought it was imperative to raise the budget process to a higher level 
within CDC to ensure integration and coordination.  
 
Dr. Zaza responded that over the last few years the question had arisen about how to take this 
to scale within the agency. There have been so many changes that have not been yet well-
integrated and they have been moving slowly with that. However, recommendations from the 
Board about what pieces are working well and are not only sustainable for COTPER, but also 
are scalable for the rest of the agency would be tremendously useful beyond COTPER.  
 
Dr. Koh recapped that there seemed to be a lot of support for priority topic 1, although there 
remained concerns about the scope and how the Board would to tackle that issue. Dr. Ursano 
raised the possibility of self-study. Regarding priority topic 2, it seemed that most people did not 
feel they were DEOC experts and if they assessed this topic, it would be from the perspective of 
the decision-making process rather than the DEOC itself. There seemed to be a fair amount of 
interest in priority topic 3, especially because it would bring in partners from outside CDC and 
COTPER. Priority topic 4 received some attention, and there was some interest in priority topic 
5. It seemed that if they had to choose four areas to start, these would be 1, 3, 4, and 5.  
 
Dr. Harrald urged the inclusion of priority topic 2, given that if the decision process does not 
work, an abundance of resources will make no difference as observed with Hurricane Katrina.  
 
Captain Terbush thought priority topic 2 was do-able, pointing out that there is a lot of 
precedence for linking operation centers and the rapid decision making process. There is some 
additional data and examples that could be brought to bear, particularly with the idea of further 
linking, sharing, and critical information requirements.  
 
Dr. Besser indicated that from a COTPER perspective, issues 1 and 5 were critically important 
to him and the agency and the budget is primarily allocated to these. The stockpile and the state 
program together represent approximately $1.4 billion. Given that this is the largest investment 
they make, any suggestions on improvements in those two areas would have major resource 
and programmatic implications. He stressed that all of the topics were included because they 
were important to COTPER, so choosing two was like picking favorite children.  
 
Dr. Adirim wondered if perhaps 1 and 5 could be reworded and scoped down somewhat. Dr. 
Koh responded that doing so would be up to the chair and co-chair of the workgroup. 
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Motion and Vote: Decision Point (5), Part A 
 
Professor Hoffman motioned that that the first two topics for peer review would be: Topic 1 
(Medical Countermeasure Delivery) and Topic 5 (Technical Assistance for Preparedness and 
Response). Dr. Muckstadt seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously.  
 
Dr. Hoffman asked whether they were committed to having four topics to be completed within a 
year, or if perhaps they could begin more slowly. 
 
Dr. Ellis responded that COTPER hoped the Board could decide on four topics to be completed 
during FY 09 so they could begin planning and working with programs. She liked the idea of 
trying to mix a heavy topic with others that were more focused, given the short timeline for 
programs to prepare for November to December reviews, and the very busy BSC chair and co-
chairs.  
 
Dr. Koh noted that priority topics 2, 3, and 4 remained from which to select the remaining two 
priorities. 
 
Dr. Harrald suggested that priority topic 2 be the third priority, and he agreed to serve as Chair. 
He suggested rewording it to, “Review the incident management and decision process as 
managed in the DEOC.” 
 
Captain Terbush volunteered to co-chair priority topic 2. 
 
Dr. Zaza pointed out that it would be an almost impossible task to ask the same people in the 
DEO to engage in two reviews back-to-back in November and December. She suggested 
splitting up 1 and 5, conducting priority topic 1 early followed by one of the DEOC priorities, and 
5 later with the other DEOC one. That is, if they preferred to assess the DEOC and the exercise 
program, they should split those up across time. 
 
Dr. Ursano suggested moving Dr. Hamburg to 4, and he agreed to move to 5.  
 
[Note: No actual motion was made or vote was taken with respect to the third and fourth 
priorities].   
 
Decision Point 6: Determine BSC Ad Hoc Workgroup Chairs and Co-Chairs  
 
The following decisions were made with respect to members of the Ad Hoc Workgroups, in 
order of priority: 
 
Priority Topic Area Ad Hoc Workgroup 
1.  Medical Countermeasure Delivery 
(Distribution and Dispensing) Capability 
(DSNS) 
 
Dr. Muckstadt, Co-Chair 
Dr. Peters, Co-Chair 
5. Technical Assistance for Preparedness 
and Response (DSLR lead) 
 
 
Mr. Stephens, Co-Chair 
Dr. Ursano 
Dr. Rowitz, Tentatively Nominated 
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Priority Topic Area                         Ad Hoc Workgroup 
2. Director’s Emergency Operations 
Center (DEOC) (DEO) [REWORDED: 
Review the incident management and 
decision processes as managed in the 
DEOC] 
 
Dr. Harrald, Chair 
Captain Terbush, Co-Chair 
 
4. Allocation Process for CDC’s “Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness and 
Response” Budget (OD / SIO)   
 
Dr. Hamburg, Tentatively Nominated 






Following the determination of the top four priority areas, establishment of their respective ad 





Dr. Koh inquired as to whether Dr. Ursano’s idea of self-study was a feasible option. 
 
Dr. Ellis responded she thought it would be; however, she wanted to carefully work through that 
and come back to the Board after having an opportunity to discuss the option further with Drs. 
Besser, Sosin, and the program about the best way forward on that. 
 
Dr. Besser added that he learned from Dr. Stephens that the self-study method is used by other 
BSCs and offices. COTPER could reach out and learn from other groups who have used it, 
taking some of the burden off the workgroups and placing it back on COTPER. 
 
Dr. Stephens suggested seeking information from the following groups which have used the 
self-study model: 1) NCEH used a self-review followed by verify and clarify with the Board, and 
ultimately a review by the Board; and 2) NIOSH went through a process with the National 
Academies, in essence developing a self-review. 
 
Dr. Ellis reminded everyone that COTPER would like to hear the members’ comments on the 
draft document located in Tab 7 that outlines the proposed process and criterion review.  
 
Dr. Harrald suggested that the chairs and co-chairs report back to the full Board in a short 
timeframe with a revised problem statement for each of the priority topic areas.  
 
Future agenda items suggested during this discussion included the following: 
 Nuclear / radiological issues  
 Isolation and quarantine strategies which perhaps should be an on-going agenda item (Dr. 
Quinlisk will seek information pertaining to a group currently examining isolation and 
quarantine, from whom a report is due out in June 2009) 
 Sheltering in place (one way to deal with the nuclear issue is to include it with quarantine 
and sheltering in place) 
Closing Discussion / Future Agenda Determinations 
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With no further business raised or discussion posed, Dr. Koh officially adjourned the first 
COTPER BSC meeting. 
 
 
I hereby certify that to the best of my 
knowledge, the foregoing minutes of the 
August 5-6, 2008 COTPER BSC meeting 
are accurate and complete:  
 
______10/27/08_______________     
                 Date      ___________/S/_________________ 
 
       Dr. Howard Koh, M.D., M.P.H. 




















Public Comment Period 
Adjourn / Certification 
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Attachment 2 Acronyms 
 
ADS   Associate Director for Science 
AHRC   Atlanta Human Resource Center (HHS) 
APHIS   Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA) 
APHL   Association of Public Health Laboratories 
ASPH   Association of Schools of Public Health 
ASPR   Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (HHS) 
ASTHO  Association of State and Territorial Health Officers 
ATSDR  Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (CDC) 
BARDA  Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
BSC   Board of Scientific Counselors 
BSL-4    Biosafety Level 4 (high containment deadly pathogens laboratory)   
BCU   Biosurveillance Coordination Unit (CDC) 
CA   Cooperative Agreement 
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive agents 
CCID   Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases (CDC) 
CCEHIP  Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention (CDC) 
CDC   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CEFO   Career Epidemiology Field Officer (CDC) 
CJIS   Criminal Justice Information Services  
CoCHIS  Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service (CDC) 
CoCHP (CCHP) Coordinating Center for Health Promotion (CDC) 
COGH  Coordinating Office for Global Health (CDC) 
COOP  Continuity of Operations Plan or Continuation of Operation Plan 
COP   Common Operating Picture 
COTPER Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency               
Response (CDC) 
CPHP Centers for Public Health Practice 
CRI   Cities Readiness Initiative 
CSTE   Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologist 
DBS   Division of Business Services (CDC) 
DCIR   Director’s Critical Information Requirements (CDC) 
DDS   Deputy Director of Science 
DEO   Division of Emergency Operations (CDC) 
DEOC   Director's Emergency Operation Center (CDC) 
DFO   Designated Federal Official 
DHS   The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
DHHS   The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
DOD   Department of Defense also DoD 
DOJ   Department of Justice 
DSAT   Division of Select Agents and Toxins (CDC) 
DSLR   Division of State and Local Readiness (CDC) 
DSNS   Division of Strategic National Stockpile (CDC) 
ECO   Enterprise Communications Office (CDC) 
EIS   Epidemic Intelligence Service (CDC) 
ELR   Electronic Lab Reporting 
EOC   Emergency Operations Center (CDC) 
Epi-X   Epidemic Information Exchange  
EPMIS  Extramural Program Management Information System 
EPO   Epidemiology Program Office (CDC) 
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ERT   Emergency Response Team 
ERT-N   (National) Emergency Response Team 
ESF   Emergency Support Function (generally followed by function #) 
FACA   Federal Advisory Committee Act 
FAO   Funding Opportunity Announcement 
FECC   Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator 
FEMA   Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS) 
FOIA   Freedom of Information Act 
FRN   Federal Register Notice 
GAO   General Accounting Office 
GIS   Geographic Information System 
GSA   General Services Administration 
HAN   Health Alert Network  
HHS   Health and Human Services 
HRSA   Health Resources and Services Administration 
HSAB   Health and Safety Advisory Board 
HSIN-CI  Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure 
HSPD-21  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
IAG    Interagency Agreement also IAA - Interagency Agreement 
ICP   Incident Command Post 
ICS   Incident Command System 
IG   Inspector General 
IMS   Incident Management System 
IOM   Institute of Medicine 
IRCT   Incident Response Coordination Team 
JTTF   Joint Terrorism Task Force 
LNO   Liaison Officer 
LRN   Laboratory Response Network 
LOPR   Learning Office for Preparedness and Response (CDC) 
MASO   Management Analysis and Services Office (CDC) 
MMWR  Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (CDC) 
MOO    Management Operations Officer 
MRE   Meals Ready-to-Eat 
NAHLN  National Animal Health Laboratory  
NALBOH   National Association of Local Boards of Health 
NAPHSIS   National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems 
NAS    National Academy of Sciences 
NBIC   National Biosurveillance Integration Center (DHS) 
NCBDDD   National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities (CDC) 
NCPDCID National Center for Preparedness Detection and Control of Infectious 
Diseases (CDC) 
NCCDPHP  National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion (CDC) 
NCEH   National Center for Environmental Health (CDC) 
NCHM  National Center for Health Marketing (CDC) 
NCHS   National Center for Health Statistics (CDC) 
NCHSTP   National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention (CDC) 
NCID    National Center for Infectious Diseases (CDC) 
NCIPC   National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (CDC) 
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NCIRD   National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (CDC) 
NCPHI  National Center for Health Informatics (CDC) 
NCTC   National Counterterrorism Center  
NCZVED  National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (CDC) 
NDMS   National Disaster Medical System 
NECC   National Emergency Coordination Center (FEMA) 
NEDSS   National Electronic Disease Surveillance System  
NEIS    National Earthquake Information Service 
NERRTC   National Emergency Response & Rescue Training Center (“nertsy”) 
NETSS   National Electronic Telecommunications Surveillance System  
NICC    National Infrastructure Coordinating Center 
NIH   National Institutes of Health 
NIOSH  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (CDC) 
NJTTF  National Joint Terrorism Task Force 
NLTN   National Laboratory Training Network 
NNDSS  National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance Systems 
NRCC   National Response Coordination Center  
NRP   National Response Plan 
NOC   National Operations Center (DHS) 
NOES   National Occupational Exposure Survey 
NORAD  North American Aerospace Defense Command 
NSAR   National Select Agent Registry 
NVPO   National Vaccine Program Office 
OCIIE   Office of Critical Information Integration and Exchange 
OD    Office of the Director 
ODP    Office of Domestic Preparedness 
OEA   Organizational Excellence Assessment 
OEP   Office of Emergency Preparedness 
OET   Office of Emergency Transportation 
OGDP   Office of Genomics and Disease Prevention (CDC) 
OGH   Office of Global Health (CDC) 
OHS   Office of Health and Safety (CDC) 
OMEB  Organic Methods Evaluation Branch (OSHA) 
OMS    Outbreak Management System 
OMSPH  Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health 
OPPE   Office of Program Planning and Evaluation (CDC) 
OPR    Office of Preparedness and Response (HHS) 
OSEP   Office of Security and Emergency Preparedness (CDC) 
OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
OTC   Over-the-Counter (referring to medications not requiring prescription) 
OWCD  Office of Workforce and Career Development (CDC) 
PAHPA  Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act (PL 109-417) 
PDW    Preparedness Data Warehouse 
PHEMCE  Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (HHS) 
PHLIP   Public Health Lab Interoperability Program  
PHPPO   Public Health Practice Program Office (CDC) 
PHTEA  Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act (PL 106-505) 
POETE   Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, Exercise 
PSB-Ext   Program Services Branch – Extramural Branch 
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Acronyms 
 
PWMS  Preparedness Workforce Management System (CDC) 
RCC   Regional Coordination Center 
RRCC   Regional Response Coordination Center 
SAs   Select Agents 
SAP   Select Agent Program 
SGE    Special Government Employee 
SIO   Strategy and Innovation Office (CDC) 
SIOC   Strategic Information & Operations Center 
SME   Subject Matter Expert 
SMO   Senior Management Official 
SNS   Strategic National Stockpile (CDC) 
SOC   Secretaries Operations Center (HHS) 
SPAR-x   Countermeasure Surveillance, Preparedness and Response System 
SPHPO  Science and Public Health Practice Office (CDC) 
TAC   Technical Advisory Committee 
TARU   Technical Advisory Response Unit (CDC) 
USDA   United States Department of Agriculture 
USPHS   United States Public Health Service 
USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 
VOAD/NVOAD  (National) Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster 
WCDO  Workforce and Career Development Office (CDC) 
WISQARS   Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
